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INTRODUCTION * 
Rusumo is a small Rwandese border town located on the Rwanda-
Tanzania border, near the confluence of the two main tributaries of 
the Kagera River (Nyabarongo and Ruvubu). The location is only a 
little way from the three way border point of Burundi, Rwanda and 
Tanzania, upstream the Nyabarongo. But the name Rusumo has now assumed 
a special significance in the lexicon of international development 
cooperation for two primary reasons. 
Firstly, it was at Rusumo that the Heads of State of Rurimdij, 
Rwanda and Tanzania signed the Agreement creating the Organization for 
the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin (hereinafter 
referred to as KBO) on 24th August 1977. Hence, the agreement is 
properly called the Rusumo Treaty. The purpose of the agreement is to 
promote the development of the contracting states through the manage-
ment of the natural resources of the basin
s
 particularly by regulation 
of the flow of the river to facilitate energy production and transfer 
of the water to agricultural lands. The parties expect that such an 
activity should also enhance the developmental aspects of industriali-
zation and mining. 
Secondly, that border point is also the location of Rusumo 
Falls, already identified as the point where regulation of the flow 
of the Kagera River would enhance energy production both at the 
Rusumo Falls and at two other strategic sites downstream, namely 
Kishanda Valley and Kakono. Thus, Rusumo power project was to be the first 
*The information in this paper
1
 was collected as part of a broader 
study on "The Contribution of Drainage Basin Organizations to 
Development in Africa" covering, also Senegal, Niger and Limpopo. 
The research was done through direct interviews with the officials 
in the respective fields, supported by primary official documents 
of those organizations and other publications. 
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major joint project of the KBO giving it a central place- But 
this centrality raised other issues
 s
 particularly of the appropriate 
capacity of the dam, and therefore, the land area likely to be 
innundated by the backwater effect. Because of the scarcity of 
arable land in the area the question of the capacity of the Rusumo 
dam to be created was so controversial that it threatened to 
paralyse the prospects of the KBO programmes from the start. So 
salient was the controversy that from a distances it seemed as if 
kusumo dam and associated hydropower plan was the only development 
project planned by KBO. 
Certainly, that was not the case, The development 
plans of KBO tended to reflect the diversity of the development 
problems of the basin states. Three out of the four basin states, 
Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, are land-locked and non-oil producers. 
Therefore, while transport and communication,as "vehicles" of export and 
import trade, constitute a general bottleneck for their development, 
the situation is particularly exacerbated by the problem of hydro-
carbon imports which have to be transported over long distances and 
across other territories. Such long transports would threaten the 
cost-effectiveness of such imported energy resources for industrial 
and domestic consumption. Moreover, the fluid political and security 
situation in most of Africa makes reliance
 o n
 such imports rather 
trecherous. In fact, on both of the foregoing points, Tanzania's 
West Lake Region is in equally precarious position. 
While northwestern Tanzania shares the foregoing 
adverse physical and economic conditions with Rwanda and Burundi, 
the latter two free different conditions for agricultural productivity 
and development from Tanzania. Rwanda and Burundi, it will be 
explained, are the most densely populated countries in Africa and where 
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agricultural productivity can be enhanced only by intensive 
practises while Tanzania's northwest is sparsely populated and with 
large reserves. But in both cases, various inputs, particularly 
fertilizers, will be an imperative. 
The recognition of the common development problems in the 
region induced the three basin states to initiate consultations and 
studies which led to the conclusion of the agreement at Rusumo. The 
purpose was to establish a cooperative framework within which the 
states would jointly plan projects in the areas of energy production; 
agricultural development; industrialization, especially in the agro-
based sectors; transport and communication; mineral exploration and 
exploitation; environmental management; and tourism. 
The purpose of this paper is, pnrtly, to outline the provision 
of the 1977 Agreement to establish the commitment of the contracting 
states and, partly, to assess the policy plans already developed for 
the realization of the objectives expressed in the agreement. 
As a preface to that analysis, the next part of the paper will 
outline the physical setting of the.Kagera basin and some of the 
salient economic implications of that setting, Part III will analyse 
the Rusumo agreement, in terms of the area of application, the sub-
jects to which the treaty applies and the scope of commitment of 
the member states. 
Part IV will give a synoptic profile of the development 
projects planned for the fulfillment of the agreement. These will 
be classified as: (1) water-related projects, including hydros-electric 
energy production, irrigated and rainfed agriculture, forestry, 
livestock and fishing, (2) transport and communication, (3) industries. 
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From that range of activities, it is obvious that the member 
states should be concerned about environmental protection in the basin. 
The foregoing range of planned development activities would necessarily 
generate or hasten adverse environmental changes which must be kept under 
control. In Part V the salient environmental implications of the 
development activities would be extrapolated. The section will then 
establish if those adverse consequences were anticipated in the con-
stituent agreement and what additional protective provisions should have 
been included therein. 
Part VI of the paper will outline some financial implications of 
the development programmes, especially the scope of the needs and 
management of financial resources. 
THE PHYSICAL SETTING OF KAGERA BASIN 
Kagera River empties its load into Lake Victoria in Uganda 
territory, slightly to the north of the Tanzania-Uganda border, while 
Lake Victoria has the Nile as its only drainage outlet. Some observers 
have suggested that the Kagera and its tributaries actually constitute 
the most southerly end of the Nile drainage system. That hypothesis 
submits that hydro-geologically, it is possible to trace the ancient 
bed of the Kagera as it continues from the present mouth of the river 
into the Jinja point of the Nile by a clear depression in the bottom 
of Lake Victoria. 
Be that cs it might, the Kagera has its own character as a 
river with its main sources in the western highlands of Rwanda and 
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Burundi."^ The two main tributaries are the Ruvubu, which drains an 
area approximately 12,3000 square kilometers in central and northern 
Burundi, and the Nyabarongo which drains approximately 16,000 square 
kilometers in west-central and eastern Rwanda. Of the two, the 
Nyabarongo is more hydrologically complex with several sub-tributaries 
contributing to its load. The Nyabarongo traverses about 300 kilometers 
from its sources in western Rwanda to its outlet in the Lake Rugwero 
in Southern Rwanda. Its principal tributary is the Akanyuru which 
flows from a direct southerly direction and joins Nyabarongo at a point 
about 50 kilometers to the south of Kigali. From Lake Rugwero to its 
confluence with the Ruuubu the 'Nyabarongo is better known as Akagera. 
It is also important to note that for its entire stretch from 
Lake Rugwero to the confluence the Nyabarongo forms the border of Rwanda 
and Burundi in a 60 kilometers of ardous meanders through swamp-lands. 
The Ruvubu originates from the southern part of the Congo-Nile 
Divide, in Burundi for a distance of 350 kilometers to its confluence 
with the Akagera (Nyabarongo) which is only two kilometers upstream 
from Rusumo Falls. Its main tributary is the Ruvironza, which joins 
the mainstream Ruvubu near Gitega, but there are several other sub-
tributaries. 
1. Succinct information on the Kagera and KBO is supplied in the KBO 
publication, General Background Information on the Panning for the 
Development of the Kagera River Basin. Prepared by the 
Secretariat of the Kagera Basin Organization, Kigali, April 1979 
(hereinafter KBO General Background, 1979) from which the following 
information is derived-
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At Rusumo Falls the river forms a gorge with a drop approximately 
30 meters over a distance less than one kilometer. This provides the 
potential site for the core Kagera Basin development commencing with 
hydro-electric power generation. 
From Rusumo the Kagera takes a direct northerly direction, 
forming th^ Rwanda-Tanzania border, upto the three way Burundi-Tanzania-
Uganda border, where it is joined by the Kngifcumba, flowing from the 
west. In that stretch the river valley widens considerably, and is 
enclosed by heavy pppyrus swamps. The broader basin is also dotted 
with several small lakes, beside the river, all of which add to the 
biological and hydro-geological diversity of the Kagera basin and the 
National Park. This total distance from Rusumo to the Kagitumba con-
fluence is approximately 230 kilometers. 
From Kagitumba confluence that Kagera changes to a directly 
eastern direction and flows for another 250 kilometers to enter Lake 
Victoria. For the first 60 kilometers of that distance, the Kagera forms 
» , i ' 
the Tanzania-Uganda border. At the junction with Kishanda, » small 
tributary from southerly direction, the Kagera leaves the border and 
flows in Tanzaniar. territory through agriculturally active areas of 
Kakono and Kyaka, then a north-easterly direction, crossing the border 
and flowing its last 25 kilometers through Uganda, into Lake Victoria. 
The total length of the Kagera River is approximately 840 kilometers. 
Throughout that distance the basin of the river covers four 
national territories distributed as follows; 
- 7 -
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Country Total Area (KiPy) Percentage of Basin 
Tanzania 20,800 35 
Rwanda 19,900 33 
Burundi 13,300 22 
Uganda 5,800 10 
TOTAL 59,800 100 
The climate varies drastically over the basin area, and so 
does the rainfall and run-off. The main rainfall period is March to 
May, with a secondary peia in October to November. The average annual 
rainfall along the western shores of Lake Victoria are approximately 
1300 to 2,000 milimeterso But rainfall, initially decreases sharply 
westwards with Kyaka receiving about 800 milimeters, then the rain-
fall trend increases westwards to approximately 1,800 at the Congo-
Nile Divide. 
In all, Kagera River contributes about 25 percent of the 
annual discharge into Lake Victoria, averaging approximately 184 million 
cubic meters per second at Kyaka. It is estimated that 85 percent of 
the discharge of the Kagera River is generated in the Nyabarongo and 
Akanyaru, that is western and southern Rwanda, and in the kuvubu, up-
stream of Mumwendo ferry, again indicating southern and western and 
southern Burundi. These would suggest rainfall avaeraging moderate to 
low in central and eastern basin. 
The proportion of arable land to the population in the region 
indicates high and increasing pressure on land within the basin. 
The background reports estimated the total population in the basin in 
1973 as 5.6 million with an average annual increase of approximately 
2.6 per cent. 
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It is also to be noted that Rwanda and Burundi are the most 
densely populated countries in Africa, with an average of 151 and 146 
people per square kilometer, respectively. Rwanda's total area is 
26,338 square kilometers while Burundi is 25,680 square kilometers. 
Out of that total 75 percent in Rwanda is within Kagera basin while for 
Burundi 52 percent of the land is in the Kagera basin. Tanzania's 
West Lake Region is endowed with 28,456 square kilometers of which 73 
percent is in the Kagera basin, with a population density averaging 38 
people per square kilometer. 
Thus, for Rwanda and Burundi, the value of land is critically 
high, a factor which will explain the sensitivity of these states to 
the elevation of Rusumo dam. 
The economy of the basin area is predominantly dependent on 
agricultural sector, with 95 percent of the population engaged in 
production of food crops, particularly bananas, beans, rice, maize, 
cassava and potatoes. The main cash crops are coffee and tea, but the 
basin states are by no means major producers. At subsistence level, 
the land is fully cultivated. Therefore, increased productivity is 
only possible with intensified inputs such as fertilizers, improved 
seed varieties, extension work and organized storage and market systems. 
In terms of basic development indicators, the World Bank has 
given the following 1983 data for the basin states:^ Rwanda GNP is 
270 dollars; annual growth rate averages 2.3 percent and life ex-
2. World Bank, World Development Report 1985 (Oxford Uni-
versity Press) p.210. 
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peccancy at birth is 47 years. Tanzania GNP is 240 dollars; annual 
grcwth rate is 0.9 percent and life expectancy at birth is 51 years. 
Uganda GNP is 220 dollars; annual growth rate of -4.4 percent and 
life expectancy at birth is 4S years. The fact is that there are 
no major economic activities attracting income into the region. 
In ultimate terms foregoing economic conditions and the 
general physical setting are exacerbated by the transportation and 
cc^unication problems of the lanc-locked states. The traffic links 
are long and therefore expensive since they largely move overland 
from Mombasa, through Eldoret and Uganda, or from Dar es Salaam 
through Kigoma into Burundi. By 1979 the KBO Background studies 
reported that the average cost of transport per ton was US$250 and 
was rising. At the same time they have had to deal with the political 
chaos in Uganda for the past fifteen years, with the more expensive 
and less direct alternatives through Tanzania. 
With these problems in mind the basin states decided to create 
the permanent institutional and legal framework for the management 
and development in the entire Kagera basin. 
THE KUSUMO AGREEMENT - IN A NUTSHELL 
1. Background 
The Rusumo Agreement which established the KBO had not ante-
cedent in the form of a legal and institutional framework for the 
3 
management and development of the Kagera basin. The agreement 
3. This is clec.r contradistinction t the Senegal Lnsin situation 
where the OMVS is simply the latest in a series of attempts 
which started in earnest in 1930's. F, r -'.et. ilu see Oki'.i; 
"Development and Environment in the Senegal Basin Under the OMVS 
Treaty" (University of Nairobi, IDS, July 1986) in the series, 
especially pp. 8-15. 
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signed in August 1977 was the first attempt. Thus, whatever provides 
the background to the agreement are the series of studies initiated 
by the basin states with a view to articulating the specific develop-
ment tasks which were later to justify the conclusion of such treaty. 
Therefore, what should interest this study is the beginning and 
identity of the studies. 
The first modert-time development - oriented study of the 
region was the Hyurometeorological Survey of Lake Victoria, Kyoga, 
Albert (Mobutu Sese Seko) and George was declared operational from 
17 August 1967. This stage was preceded by a two-year preparatory 
phase during which the East African Nile Waters Coordinating Committee 
negotiated the financial and logistical arrangements with the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) . But this was to be a broadly based operation for 
the collection of data on the hydrometeorological regime of the 
drainage systen^ with the participation of Kenya, Egypt, Sudan, 
Tanzania and Uganda. Burundi and Rwanda joined the project in 1972. 
The end product were mathematical models for the quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of the water input into the drainage system.^ 
That project, though relevant, does not seem to have had 
uny impetus on the creation of the KBO. In fact, the official 
4. For details of the background to what is often known as "Hydromet 
see Okidi, C.O. "Legal and Policy Regime of Lake Victoria and 
Nile Drainage Basins" in Indian Journal of International Law Vol.20 
No.3 pp. 385, 432-433 (19S0). 
5. The progress beyond these models, if any, were to be determined 
at a joint meeting of the participating states. The meeting was 
scheduled to be held at Arusha on 4th and 5th August 19S6.. 
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position of KBO trace the origin of the treaty to the exchange of 
Presidential visits between Rwanda and Tanzania in 1986. According 
to D.K. Lwehabura,*
5
 the two presidents resolved during the visits, 
that the two countries would cooperate in the construction of a 
bridge across the Kagera River, at kusurno, to facilitate the transport 
and trade between their countries. As a supplement to that agreement, 
the two states undertook to initiate technical studies towards 
harnessing the hydroelectric power at Rusumo Falls. 
The eagerness with which these efforts were mounted is 
indicated by the fact that Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda sent 
a request to the UNDP, asking for assistance in planning and develop-
ment with the Kagera basin waters. The UNDP response came in July 
1969 when it sent a fact finding mission for consultation with the 
governments. The Mission's findings and recommendations Trcre that the 
development possibilities existed in several sectors; that UNDP project 
should be set up to coordinate the regional planning in an orderly 
fashion; that a technical committee, composed of representatives of 
the four governments should supervise the project and planning efforts; 
and that such a project should be coordinated with the on-going UNDP 
projects in the region, particularly, the Hydromet, and mineral 
research projects in Burundi and Rwanda. 
Accordingly, Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania established a 
Technical Committee through which in July 1970, they submitted a 
joint request for the project. Uganda, it should be noted, agreed 
6. D.K. Iwehabura was the first Executive Secretary of the KBO 
from August 1977 to July 1982. For the comments see his 
"Cooperation in the Management and Development of the Kagera 
River Basin" (Kigali, Rwanda, May 1981) p. 2. 
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with the concept of regional and basin-wide planning in principle, 
but chose to remain an observer until Mya, 1981.^ Thus, only three 
basin states were active participants in the project which was 
approved by the UNDP Governing Council in January 1971. 
The Kagera basin development studies was established, and 
officially started in June 1971 and its headquarters set up at 
Bukoba, Tanzania, in August, 1971. The field studies which actively 
commenced in September 1971 consisted of collection and analysis of 
existing data, identification of gaps in the data, recommendation of 
necessary additional studies and preparation of guidelines for the 
g 
second phase. These studies, constituting Phase I of the project, 
9 
were completed in June 1973. 
One of the central observations of Phase I to be taken into 
account in the subsequent study was that preparation of a succinct 
and comprehensive development plan would require several years and 
funds far in excess of the project budget. Therefore Phase II was 
required to prepare an Indicative Basin Plan based on existing data 
and a minimum amount of additional information. In other words, the 
study was to provide the main development options available to the 
7. ibid p.3. 
8. See ibid p.4 and KBO General Background 1979 op.cit. p.17. 
9. Phase I report entitled "Planning the Development of Kagera 
River Basin" was prepared by a consortium of contractors from 
Italy and Czechoslovakia in Volumes I, II and III. See 
KBO General Background 1979 loc.cit. 
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three states, taking into account the existing national priorities 
which bear on the harmonious development of the basin. 
Unlike Phase I the second one was done under eight 
different sub-contracts covering aerial photography; precise 
levelling; tourism; hydropower potentials; fisheries; and institu-
tional arrangements. The main contractors, Norconsult/Electrowatt, 
submitted the final report of Fhase II at the end of 1976,,"^ 
Another important development during the year was that in 
June 1976 the Technical Committee had unanimously accepted that the 
headquarters be transferred from Bukoba to Kigali. And that was 
effected during November 1976. 
Three other measures ware taken under the aegis of the 
Technical Committee, at the end of Phase II. The first action was a 
rigorous evaluation ox the studies done under the contracts in the 
two phases*. The second measure was the commissioning of a specific 
study on the kusumo Hydropower project. The study was to be conducted 
within the framework of a protocol signed by the Belgian Government 
at Kigali on 22 October 1976, in response to a joint request by 
Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania. The Belgian Government, in turn, 
commissioned a consortium of Tractionel/Electrobel consultants on 
June 20, 1977 to conduct the hydropower study but also to show the 
implications of the Rusumo Dam hydropower development on inter alia 
agricultural land, settlement, environment, fisheries and tourism. 
10. ibid p.20. 
* More on that will be outlined in the fourth part of this 
paper. 
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The report of Tractionel/Electrobel, issued in June 1979 contained 
"Optimization of the Dam Elevation" and "Power Market and Network". 
Since this report came after issue of Indicative Basin Plan, and 
therefore seperate from the latter, the reports were therefore to 
assist in determination of the final Action Plan issued in 1982. 
The third measure taken was to establish the Organization 
for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin, when 
the Heads of State and Government of the three countries signed 
their Agreement at Rusumo on the 24th August 1977. Evidently, 
it was the compilation of the Indicative Basin Plan produced at the 
end of the UNDP funded Phase II studies that justified for the states, 
the establishment of the legal and institutional framework. 
2. The Agreement 
This agreement may be analysed in the following specific 
sections: (a) Its establishment and area of application; (b) The 
subjects to which it applies; (c) Its principal organs and their 
functions; (d) Legal status of the organization and its projects; and 
(f) The general provisions. 
(a) Establishment and Areas of Application of the Agreement 
The Organization established under Article I of the Agree-
ment has, as its territorial jurisdiction the catchment area of the 
Kagera River and its tributaries and sub-tributaries. That means, 
11. The legal and institutional framework in the Agreement was 
based on the recommendations by Dr. Guelerimo J. Cano of 
Argentina and Professor Robert D. Hayton of the United States 
as the U.N. Consultants engaged under Phase II study to 
examine Institutional Arrangements appropriate for the manage 
ment of the Kagera Basin. Their study was done in 1974 and 
submitted as part of Phase II report in 1976. 
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essentially, the territories of Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. 
This area of application is described in Article 3 whose second 
paragraph adds that the contracting states may, by mutual agreement 
extend application of the agreement beyond the catchment area, in 
order to facilitate the "full and proper study of, and comprehensive 
planning for the implementation of the projects, wcrks, and programmes 
entailed in the harmonious development of the Basin, or where ser-
vices are to be provided to or from the Basin." 
Basically, the deference to the entirity of the catchment area 
of the river is a further expression of the principle recognized in 
the fourth paragraph of the preamble that the Kagera River Basin 
constitutes a geographical unit offering a valuable base for coopera-
tion among the riparian states. On the other hand, the probability of 
extending the application of the treaty to areas beyond the catchment, 
territories is a recognition of the past and existing commercial, 
service and social links between the basin states and their immediate 
neighbours. It is conceivable that the various activities and re-
sources related to the commercial, service and social interests may 
12 
be profitably managed by close involvement of non--basin states. 
This seems to anticipate a rather rigorous integrated regional 
development, perhaps to underscore the desire to further "develop 
and reinforce the existing co-operation between the four countries" 
12. The possible sectors under these categories might become clear 
when discussions turn to the profile of development projects. 
It is anticipated that such sectors might include environmental 
management; major mining and industrial projects; hydropower 




as expressed in the second pream'bular paragraph of the agreement. 
Contrary to this expectation for wholeness, Uganda, occupying 
ten percent of the basin, did not sign the Agreement in 1977. 
However, its participation was anticipated by the founding states 
which reserved Article 19 of that original agreement exclusively to 
the provision that: "The present Agreement is open to accession by 
Uganda"- One would have expected, in fact that Uganda, as the lowest 
riparian, should have had a special interest in the concerted con-
sumptive use of the Kagera waters, especially for irrigation upstream. 
Of all the riparian states the lowest riparian is in the most pre-
carious position as regards the security of water, should the upper 
riparians diminish the quantities throufjh consuptive use, or should the 
latter alter the quality of the water to a deleterious extent. 
For these reasons, the reluctance of Uganda to participate 
actively in the preparatory phases and in the KBO would seem somewhat 
puzzling unless it is explained in terms of the political and social 
chaos in the country which started in 1971. Truly, President Nyerere 
of Tanzania made to secret of the fact that he did not want to deal 
14 
with the Government of Idi Amino 
13. Note th.it the original Agreement referred to "three countries". 
This was changed to "four" by the amendment adopted on 19th May 
19b 1 ns an annex to the instrument of accession by Uganda to the 
Agreement. For the details, read on. 
14. In view of the changes and the chaos which followed the 1971 
coup d' tat against Milton Obote it has not been possible to 
interview officials of the overthrown government to ascertain 
the reasons why Uganda remained an observer after the joint 
request sent to UNDF in 1968. The UNDP, it will be recalled, 
indicated its concurrence in July 1969 and in July 1970 Uganda 
did not join the other three states in the establishment of 
the Technical Committee. 
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Accession of Uganda to the agreement, under Article 19, was 
a special occasion for the KBG. The instrument of accession was in 
the form of an agreement between tha three original contracting states 
and Uganda and signed by all the four parties at Bujumbura on the 
19th May 1981. The agreement, in three articles, had an annex 
comprising the amendments to the material articles of the original 
agreement affected by Uganda's participation. Article 3 of the 
instrument of accession noted th:it the amendments to the 1977 KBO 
agreement were mutually accepted by the original parties and by 
Uganda.
1
"' Uganda's accession entered into force on 16 October 1981 
after all ratification formalities were completed by the parties. 
According to Article 2. of the instrument the agreement for the 
participation of Uganda was subject to ratification and it would enter 
into force on the 30th day after the last instrument of ratification 
was deposited with the Government of Rwanda, as the depositary. 
Thus, henceforth, the area of application of the Rusumo agreement 
covered the four state territories, with the provision for extension 
as provided in Article 3 discussed above. 
(b) The Subjects to Which the Agreement Applies 
The subjects to which the agreement applies are broadly 
analysed in the Indicative Basin Plan to be discussed in the next 
Part of this paper. However, for purposes of the basic treaty 
15. Apart from the first two preambular paragraphs of the 
original agreements, the other Articles affected by the 
amendments of 19th May 1981 were Articles: 5,6,7,9,10,13,15,16, 
18 and 20. Articlc 19 which reserved the opportunity for 
accession to Uganda was deleted altogether. The last Article 
was, therefore 21, followed by the testimonium. They will 
be discussed below, under the relevant sub-sections. 
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obligations the twelve specific activit ies are listed in Article 2 
of the agreement. Very simply, the Article indicates subjects of 
development in which the K'bO is authorized by the agreement to carry 
out activities* 
In fact, the language of the article in the chapter, suggest 
that the scope of application of the agreement might extend beyond the 
activities listed. It says: "The objectives of the Organization is 
to deal with all questions relative to the activities to be carried 
out in the Kagera River Basin, notably: (empnasis added). 
And the "notable" activities are quoted here in extensos 
"(a) Water and hydropower resources development; 
(b) The furnishing of water and water-related services for mining 
nn/l I nr^ ii c; fT -f t 1 no^roti'nnc Tjnrf"nKT » cnii^Hno fnr r\t"Wir* rtnia^  
(c) Agricultural and livestock development, forestry and land re-
clamation; 
(d) Mineral exploration and exploitation; 
(e) Diseases and pest control; 
(f) Transport and communication; 
(g) Trade; 
(h) Tourism; 
(i) Wildlife conservation and development; 
(j) Fisheries and acquaculturu development; 
(k) Industrial development, including fertilizer production, 
exploration and exploitation of peat; 
(1) Environment protection." 
In effect, the agreement applies to any activities that may be 
characterized as developmental. And that is further expressed in 
IDS/Dir 284 
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the bixtn preatnbular paragraph where the contracting states "resolved 
co mike use of the satisfactory work done by the Technical Committee... 
where the broad grmut of development issues were analysed and summa-
rized in the Incicative Basin Plan. 
It may be presumed tuat this broad range of activities would 
include iilso support activities such is training and manpower develop-
ment to facilitate the conduct of the development work. Another 
activity which is implied is the establishment and maintenance of 
information aid documentation >syctem, including libraries, which would 
enhance th.. managerial capability for development in and among 
contracting states. 
(c) Principal Organs .".nd their Functions 
The organs of the t'BO ate provided for in Chapter IX (Articles 
4-11) of the agreement. As distinct from the practice in the Niger 
Basin Authority or the Organization for the Management cf the Senegal 
Basin, the KBO agreement: makes no provision for the assembly of heads 
of state and governments as the ultimate authority of the organiza-
tion. It is known that the Heads of State and Government actually 
meet every year to deliberate on and direct matters concerning the 
K.BO policies. But in the agreement, Article 4 provides for only two 
principal organs of the Organization
s
 namelyi The Commission for the 
Management and Development of th. Kagera Basin (referred to as the 
Commission) and the Secretariat, headec by an Executive Secretary. 
The Commission is composed of one representative from each 
of the contracting st'ites. Thus, the only amendment to Article". 5, 
adopted in M?y 1981, was to give effect to the participation of 
Uganda in the Commission. And the article requires that each 
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commissioner, as the national Representative, be accredited and given 
enough powers necessary for the fulfillment of the function of the 
Commission. 
For the purposes of its functions the. Commission is to meet three 
tline3 per year in ordinary sessions. However, extraordinary sessions 
may be convened at any moment provided that th>-. request is made by three 
Representatives. The venues for the meetings are to rotate among the 
capitals of the member states, but the procedure may be varied by the 
Commission for its own reasons. In any event, each session of the 
Commission is to be chaired by the Representative of the host country who 
is also to hole the chairmanship until the next ordinary session, while 
the Executive Secretary is to prepare materials and convene the sessions. 
The general powers of the Commission, as outlined in Article 7, 
may b^. summarized s including. Determination of projects, their scope 
and priorities for implementation within the framework of ehe KuO; Autho-
rity to solicit and negotiate for funds, as well as technical assistance 
from bilateral and multilateral sources, either Jirectly or efforts 
of the Executive Secretary; Budgetary control and management; and Authori 
zation of assistance by Secretariat to governments fcr purposes of the 
implementation of projects which are entirely national. Obviously, 
since the Secretariat actually prepares the reports and services the 
Commission and its meet in,, it is the Secretariat which is, by implication 
responsible for the .^bove functions u which the Commission givas 
authority. 
The Secretariat is the permanent bureau for the organization 
is its executive organ. "" It comprises the Executive Secretary, 
16. These general functions of the Secretariat arc outlined in Artie e 
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as the head of the or^an, supported by four directors, in charge of 
their respective departments. Th... Commission appoints the Executive 
Secretary; it was agreed and entrenched in the agre- ment that the first 
criw was to be a Tanzanian national. Each is to serve tor four years, in 
rotation among the states. 
It is not expressly provided that the Executive Secretary serves 
for one fixed term of four yo.:rs. Ar.d though it might be implied 
by the dir.ct reference in Artici. 8 (b) thot the tenure ia "four 
years, in rot tion amongst the. member States", some members probably 
assumed that the tenure could be extended. This is suggested uy the 
debate of the 13th Meeting of the Commission at Kigali in July 1982 
where, under agenda item number 12 some of the members had expected that 
the term of D.K. Lwehabura would tie extended."^ But that proposal was 
dropped when some of thia representatives reported that they had express 
instruction not to accept extension. In the end the Commission decided 
to entrust the executive functions to a "College of four Directors" 
until a new selection was made. 
The specific functions or responsibilities are articulated in 
Articles 9 and 10, wher.-. the four departments (each headed by a 
Director) constituting the Secretariat are provided for as follows: 
(i) Department of Finance and Administration is responsible for 
Personnel Management, Finance, General Services, Purchasing and 
Property; (ii) Department of Research and Training is responsible 
17. although 1982 was the er,d of his four year's term as the Executive 
Secre^ry, Mr. Lwehabura had been involved with the preparatory 
work of KEO since the inception of Planning and Development in the 
Technical Committee in July 1S71. 
-
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for Research and data. Laboratories, Documentation and Publication, 
and Training; (iii) Department of Planning and Projects Preparation 
is responsible for Conception, Planning and Preparation of all projects 
and programmes including technical designs, Environmental and Eco-
logical matters; (iv) Department of Project?. Implementation and Manage-
ment is responsible for execution of projects, Specification and 
18 
Procurement, Operation and Maintenance. 
The Organization is required, under Article 13, to establish 
Regional Offices of the Secretariat in each member country. Through 
such offices the Secretariat is to maintain liaison functions with 
the contracting states and to hasten communication between the organi-
sation and the member states. 
(d) Legal Status of the Organization and Its Projects 
The legal status of the KBG is stipulated in Article 16 which 
enjoins the contracting states to accord the r-quiste legal status to 
the organization, sufficient for the exercise and fulfillment of its 
objectives. In p >int of detail the article urges that in the territory 
of the member states, the organization be accorded the legal personality 
enabling it to contract, acquire 'md dispose of movable and immovable 
property and to be a party to legal proceedings. In every case, the 
Executive Secretary is to be th^. legal representative of the or-
ganization. 
18. as at the middle of 1983 the Directors of the four Departments 
were held as follows: 
(i) Finance and Administration - Mr. Hitayezu - Rwanda 
(ii) Research and Training - iir. Lwakabare - Tanzania 
(iii) Planning and Project Pr^pation - Mr. Barigume - Burundi 
(iv) Projects Implementation £> Management - iir. Besigircha-
Uganda 
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These provisions then, open the Organization and its Executive 
Secretary to the legal process, including suing and being sued, in 
the member countries. The range of development activities planned 
for the KBO, surely justifies this legal status in the contracting 
states. 
Conversely, however, these provisions drastically affect the 
provision of Article 17 which states that "the Organization, members 
of the Commission and oi the Secretariat will enjoy at the headquarters 
and in each of the member states, the required diplomatic privileges 
and immunities tor the fulfillment of their activities" (emphasis 
added). It is upto the Commission to determine the categories of 
personnel of ti.e Secretariat who should enjoy the privileges and 
immunities. 
It seems, in fact, that through special arrangements such 
employees of the KBO would be subjected to the process of the host 
country under special circumstances, expressly permitted by that host 
state. Effectively, the so called immunities would be only subject of 
comity given the legal personality already extended under Article 
16 with its implications for commercial and other forms of contracts. 
The projects of the KBO have not been given the kind of legal 
status found under the Senegal Basin Organization OMVS, by the 
19 
Convention adopted in December 1978. Perhaps the KBO will have to 
19. After the OMVS memDer states decided in 1974 that they should 
clearly stipulate status of common works (Ouvrages Communs) they 
initiated studies which culminated in the adoption of the Con-
vention relating to the Legal Status of the Common Works on 
December 12, 1978. In a nutshell, the Convention designated cer-
tain projects c.s common works, to be run as independent companies 
of the OMVS. The member states could be co-owners, joint owners or 
to own shares. For details see Okidi, "Development and the Environ-
ment in the Senegal Basin, under the OMVS Treaty" op.cit. pp.23-25. 
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face upto chat question as its first regional project such as the 
Rusumo aam approaches actual construction. In these initial stages the 
KBO seems content with the characterization "inter-state" projects work 
or programme in the second section of Article 2. In that formulation an 
inter-state project is one which involves the territory of more than one 
state; with direct benefits to more than one state; or is likely to have 
beneficial or prejudicial effects in two or more states. 
(e) Legal Aspects of Funding of the Organization and Its Projects 
The two broad categories of budgets for which th.
;
 KBO states need 
to make clear legal arrangements are: Administrative budget, required 
for the functioning of the Secretariat and other organs of the organiza-
tion including regional offices; and the Programme or operational 
budget, required for the implementation of the objectives of the 
organization. 
The provision in the Agreement for administrative budget is precise. 
The first paragraph of Article 15 states that: 
"The tunds necessary for the functioning of the Secretariat, 
according to the annual budget as approved by the Commission, 
sh;.ll be contributed by the member States in equal proportion 
of 25% each." 
20 
Thus, the total is a hundred per cent for the four member §tates. The 
second paragraph requires that the payments be made on half yearly, in 
advance, and in covertible currency. Except that all local expenses, 
20. Befor accession of Uganda to the agreement the three member 
States shared the administrative budget as follows: Burundi - 25%; 
Rwanda - 35%; and Tanzania - 40%. Presumably, this was 
according to some index of economic ability. This is one of the 
provisions amended on the 19th May 1981. 
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including those for sustenance of the regional offices, are to be 
reserved in local currencies. 
Under Aiticle 13, the Regional Offices are established as 
liaison offices for th^ Secretariat. It is required therein that 
the host government, depending on its capability, should provide 
facilitiet for the functioning of the of ice, until such time that the 
Organization will be in a position to provide them directly. But the 
host state is to credit such expenses to its share of annual contribution. 
The provisions relating to programme or operation budget are 
rather scanty. They can be discovered in the powers of the Commission 
expressed in Article 7. Paragraph (b) empowers the Commission to 
submit requests to and sign agreements as well as to assume obligations, 
on behalf of KBO, for bilateral and/or multilateral technical assistance 
or financing. The following paragraph empowers the Commission to 
approve the budget and the work programme of the Secretariat, Pre-
sumably, this would relate to Implementation of the projects. 
Reference is also made to assistance which may be requested by govern-
ments, from the Secretariat, for purposes of implementation of projects, 
and which the Secretariat is obliged to provide, after approval by 
the Commission.^ 
It would appear that project implementation of KBO is intended 
to rely on the technical assistance and finance solicited by the 
Commission, as shown above. No reference is made to possible loan 
arrangements and the system: for their guarantee as is elaborately 
done by the OMVS States. The latter organization actually adopted a 
21. See Articles 7(g) and 11. 
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Convention Relating to Financial Arrangements for Common Works on 
22 
May 12, 1982. By that agreement the OMVS states provided the details 
for loan guarantee, cost sharing and a formula apportionment of benefits. 
Stop-g^p measures for member-statfe funding before the externla re-
sources are obtained is another factor covered by OMVS which the KBO 
States should consider. 
As it is the financial arrangements and scope for funding of 
common works is not woefully insufficient to measure possible financiers. 
(f) The General Provisions 
The tour items covered in Chapter VI, on General Provisions are: 
Settlement of disputes; Amendment to the convention; liquidation; and 
entry into force. The last one has been covered in the preceding pages. 
The provision on settlement of disputes is rather laconic. It 
requires, first, that any disputes arising from application if the agree-
ment shall be resolved by consultation among the jember states. Should 
that procedure fail, resort should bn- had to the procedures provided 
in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity. 
Considering the complex technical and management problems involved 
in the basin development and management the author of the agreement should 
have beemo mere elaborate and substantive in the question of settlement 
of disputes. Very particularly, the questions of water apportionment 
and negative impacts of development require more contemporary and 
sensitive machineries, more specific than the OAU procedure which was 
22. See Okidi, supra note 19 pp. 25-27. 
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largely geared to the problems of political and security difference. 
On amendment to the Agreement Article 19 provides that an 
amendment proposed by any member state shall be adopted only if it is 
accepted unanimously by all the member states. And it enters into 
force on the thirtieth day after the date of deposit of the last 
instrument of ratification with the Secretariat. But in event of 
dissolution of the organizations Article 20 provides that a liquidators 
agreed upon by the member states, shall assess the respective assets 
and liabilities. It Is presumed that the assets and liabilities will 
include outstanding loans, if there are any, extended to the organiza-
tion for implementation of its projects. But again such a dissolution 
might confront problems with projects of inter-state character such as 
the proposed hydroelectric power plant. 
A PROFILE OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
The purpose of this part of the paper is to outline sectoral 
projects and support services proposed for the objectives of KBO. It 
was pointed out earlier that the Indicative Basin Plan was considered 
the preferred outline of such projects, and was accordingly acknowledged 
in the preamble to the agreement. However, the Indicative Basin Plan 
was itself subjected to further appraisal and was later superceded 
by a more determinate report. What now constitutes the "blue print" 
of the development projects is contained in a six (actually blue 
covered) volumes report of a multi-disciplinary-multi-donor mission 
23. Settlement of Disputes is dealt with in Art. 18. The point will 
be dealt with further aud recommendation made in the discussions 
ou Environmental Implications of the Development Projects, infra. 
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organized by the UNDP in cooperation with KBO, and fielded in April 
1980. Its final report to be referred to as Action Plan was submitted 
In February 1982. 
The key sectors covered in the Action Plan, and which will be 
24 
outlined hereunder are: (1) Water related projects, including hydro-
power production, irrigated Agriculture, rainfed agriculture, forestry, 
livestick, ,and fishing; (2) Transport and communication; (3) Industries; 
(4) Training and Manpower Development. 
But before we get to these issues it is important, for the record, 
to give a synoptic background of the additional evaluational work after 
the Indicative Basin Plan, linking it to the multi-disciplinary-multi-
donor Report. However, the profile itself will rely on that Final Report. 
Background 
The complexity of drainage basin planning is well underscored by 
the experience of the Kagera basin states within the decade of 
preparatory studies. It will be recalled that when the Indicative 
Basin Plan was submitted by the consultants, Norconsult AS in 1976 
it was so cleanly satisfactory to the states that they made it the basis 
of the Rusumo Agreement. In fact, in their letter of May 28, 1976, 




penultimate paragraph that in their view there was "no alternative to 
24. The Reports are slightly reorganized in this paper to suit our 
discussions. The actual Final Reports produced jointly by the 
UNDP and KBO are produced as follows: Volume 1 - Rainfed 
Agriculture. Volume 2 - Irrigated Agriculture. Volume 3 - Energy. 
Volume 4 - Transport. Volume 5 - Industries, Health and 
Environment. Volume 6 - Executive Summary. 
Note that the crucial subject of environment is treated in its 
own separate part of the paper. On the other hand we have in-
cluded a small section on training, which did not figure promi-
nently in the Final Report. 
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the recommended development plan". And they added, "Moreover, 
it must be implemented promptly and effectively../
1
 These words 
indicate the confidence they had in the report. 
Before these conclusions the letter had summarized the salient 
points in their recommendations in the Plan. Firstly, they emphasized 
the need for promoting food self-sufficiency in the region, urging 
that the increase should be at a minimum rate of 2.5 to 3 per cent, 
to keep up with the population growth. Secondly, the Plan recommended 
intensification of subsistence agricultural sector in the region, 
taking into account that there was no visible surplus and that there 
was no land reserve to extend into. Accordingly, the only way to 
increase production is by substantially expanded agricultural inputs, 
particularly inorganic fertilizers to restore and maintain soil 
fertility. 
Thirdly, the Indicative Basin Plan recommended mobilization of 
what the letter referred to as "th only known, important undeveloped 
asset in the region..." - hydropower. They observed that the main 
river power stations could produce 200 to 300 megawatts of firm power 
at an average on-site cost of less than 15 mills (US) per KWH. But 
they noted that the only potential economic use for that quantity 
of electric energy is the production of fertilizers at or near the 
power stations. Evidently, the implication was that the fertilizers 
would enhance agricultural productivity as recommended above. 
Accordingly, they recommended the harnessing of the power 
resource which would only partly supply the demand centres in 
Kigali and Bujumbura. Interestingly enough, they did not mention 
West Lake Region of Tanzania which has particularly critical energy 
problems. 
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It is equally notable that irrigated agriculture took a low 
fourth place in the Plan recommendation. They submitted that this 
would be considered "in the longer term" and, presumably, for reasons 
of climate and topography, to be undertaken largely in the lower Kagera 
valley of Tanzania, where land is considerable and under-utilized. The 
Plan envisaged that with the combined power generated from Rusumo, 
Kiohanda and Kakono they should produce 100,000 tonnes of ammoniac 
25 
by the year 2000. There would also be 325,000 tonnes of calcium 
nitrate, obtained by addition of limestone. Then 100,000 tonnes of 
phosphates and 15,000 tonnes of potash would be imported from Zaire or 
Uganda, for the production of 490,000 tonnes of fertilizers which should 
meet the requirements for the year 2000. And this was estimated to 
cost US $85 per tonne, as against imported fertilizer which costs 
US $160 per tonne. 
On examination of the Indicative Basin Plan after the agreement 
was signed both UNDP and the participating governments resolved that the 
options presented "in the Indicative Basin Plan do not constitute an 
exclusive strategy for development acceptable to the member states and 
to the potential donors.""^ 
The main grounds for the reservations seemed to revolve around 
what they thought wat. inexhaustive analysis of available options. For 
instance, they argued that other energy options, notably, peat and 
25. Additional data summarizing the Indicative Basin Plan are con-
tained in KBO General Background, 1979, op.cit. pp. 29-31 from 
which these and the following data are derived. 
26. ibid, p.23. 
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gas, were ruled out without much analysis. Besides, the sources 
of power available from outside the basin were net considered. More-
over, other possible substitutes to fuelwood, such as peat were 
sufficiently evaluated. And in all, the UNDP and the contracting 
states wanted to see an appraisal beyond the three hydrcpower potentials; 
such other projects like Mumwendo, Gitega and Murogwe should have been 
considered. 
It was also considered inappropriate that the Plan should permit 
a plan where fertilizer production alone would utilize an over-
whelming share of the available power resources. Besides they also 
wanted a study which would cover transport, storage and distribution 
of the fertilizer, factors not covered in the Plan. 
Analysis of transportation routes and options were also con-
sidered insufficient. The ferry system across fcake Victoria, the 
route, through Zaire and some of the mall options were not adequately 
covered in the Plan, thus raising the question of bias. And they 
wanted feasibility studies of Musoma-Arusha-Tanga rail link, to 
provide a new outlet to ocean for Rwanda and Burundi. 
For these reasons the UNDP and the participating Governments 
rejected the confident assertions by Norconsult, about the Indicative 
i ' i ) •' •• 
Basin Plan. The UNDP then fielded two short-term missions to review 
the recommendations, on the projects and institutional issues and to 
prepare for a donor conference. 
One mission was undertaken by Nobert Beyrard France was 
primarily to review the Phase II report which had been submitted by 
Norconsult/Electrowatt, and included the Indicative Basin Plan
s 
hold further consultations and to prepare alternative development 




multi-donor mission for a final Action Plan. The second mission
5 
was to be concerned with the institutional and organizational 
proposals for KBO. 
Norbert Beyrard France had his own brief findings and recom-
mendations. However, it will be recalled that the central purpose 
of that mission was to analyse the Phase II report of Norconsult/ 
Electrowatt, particularly the Indicative Basin Plan, and to draw 
up guidelines for a thorough and hopefully, definitive multi-
disciplinary-multi-donor mission. Perhaps for these reasons the 
N.B. France report came out largely in form of options, and further 
28 
areas of research, particularly as regards the agricultural sector. 
In the agricultural sector the mission offered four options, 
ranging from the Phase two prescription which suggested a combination 
of 90,000 hectares irigation plus improvement in rainfed agriculture, 
to irrigation of 200,000 hectares of new land plus supplementary 
irrigation/ralnfed operation on the small perimeters of privately 
farmed lands. Additional projections hypothesized in relation to the 
options is that the yield per hectare would be doubled from the 1970's 
rate, and an additional 500,000 hectares in the whole region would 
be freed for export crops. Agro-industrial processing would also be 
established and intensified to meet local needs and to provide employment 
opportunities. The population in the basin states is expected to 
reach 17 million. 
27. This mission apparently had an assortment of experts: D. 
Caponera from FAO, W . Emerson, and J. Frippiat of UNDP/OPE 
all under leadership of R< Berthelot of UNDP/RBA. See ibid 
pp. 23-24. 




Transportation and communication links particularly/to alleviate 
the vagaries of land-locked status of the region. And that the studies 
of the alternative railway and road routes should endeavour to provide 
links through agricultural and potential mining areas. The external 
links proposed were all for access to the Indian Ocean. The three main 
railway options ace the northern corridor through Kenya to Mombasa; 
the Musoma to Tanga link; and the Mwanza to Dar cs Salaam link. Both 
of the latter links presuppose expansion of Kemondo Bay as the main port 
west of Lake Victoria for traffic from Gitega and Rusumo as well as 
from Kigali. Establishment and expansion of telecommunication links 
is also stressed for study. 
The energy sector is to be studied for irrigation as well as 
for pumped irrigation. But special emphasic is placed on assessment of 
the continued exploitation of fuelwood on the environment. As a possible 
substitute for fuelwood peat is proposed but the mission stressed the 
I • ;' i 
necessity to study, among other things, the optimum exploitation 
conditions and impact on the environment. 
Broadlv-based environmental impact studies af irrigation, 
creation of reservoirs, transport infrastructure, tsetse fly eradica-
tion and human settlement were also stressed. 
The broad outline of priority projects as well as subject areas 
requiring additional research were presented at the first KBO Donors 
Conference in Paris in October> 1979. The main features were endorsed 
but there was mutual and . unanimous agreement that further detailed 
preinvestment studies were required to concretize ancl finalize the 
project sectors> Accordingly, a multi-donor multi-disciplinary mission 
was constituted and fielded by KBO and UNDP in April 1980. Their 
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report, Action Plan submitted in February 1982, is the basis of the 
29 
outline of development projects which follows. 
1. Water Related Projects 
Water is a central factor in basin development. Accrodingly, a 
large number of development projects anticipated within the programme fall 
under this category. They include (a) hydroelectric power generation; 
(b) irrigated agriculture; (c) rainfed agriculture; (d) others, 
including forestry, fishing, livestock and game cropping. The four 
categories will be taken in turn. 
(a) Hydro-electric Power Generation 
The Action Plan actually considered energy resources, other than 
30 
hydropower, available within the Kagera basin. Wood fuel, used al-
most exclusively for domestic cooking and heating, is already under 
pressure. And its continued use is likely to lead to serious 
ecological and environmental consequences. Although efforts at 
afforestation might alleviate the pressure other dependable sources 
of energy are urgently needed. 
Methane
 fJ
us exists in large quantities beneath Lake Kivu, and 
extensive studies have determined the reserves and ways of extracting it. 
However, the Action Plan submits that there are still serious political, 
technical and social problems hindering their exploitation. 
29. Outlined in note 24 supra. 
30. It will be recalled that failure to appraise other energy options 
was one of the criticisms raised against the Indicative Basin 
Plan in particular, and Phase II studies in general. 
For the following comments of appraisal, see Development 
Programme of the Kagera 3asin: Final Report Volume 3. Energy 




Peat deposits in Rwanda and Burundi are not yet fully studied 
to determine their qualities and quantities. The current estimates 
indicate limited quantities possibly enough for a fifteen years
1 
t 
supply. Therefore it is net a promising substitute for other energy 
resources. 
Geothermal energy sources have been located in north-western 
Rwanda, but tne quantities are not fully determined. In general, geo-
thermal power would not be expected to provide a dependable alternative. 
Solar energy is another source for which some studies have been 
conducted, but neither is the technology auvanced sufficiently nor do 
the climatological conditions appear conducive to large scale production. 
These conclusions then leave the hydropower as the only resource 
for which there is sufficiently abundant potential in the region. The 
production of these energy resources are ideally to be targetted against 
1 * 
the energy demand in the region. These are indicated by the total 
31 energy balance in the region upto the year 2000 as in Table 1 below. 
From the data in Table 1 below the Action Plan drew the con-
clusion that additional energy production of 599.3 Gwh/year would be 
required by the year 1990 to satisfy the regional energy network and 
1322.8 Gwh by the year 2000. This would suffice to replace the ther-
mal plants currently in use as well as to meet the future energy demands 
of the region. Further, it was emphasized that action for the develop-
ment to meat the energy deficits should be commenced if production 
arises are to be avoided. 
Fundamentally> the objectives underlying these demand and supply 
projections are tied to improving the well-being of the population in 
the basin. Other basic and associated objectives are to develop cheap 





and renewable hydropower resources to reduce dependence on thermal 
plants using expensive imported fuels, to increase food production 
through pumped irrigation: to stimulate industries; and to develop 
mining in the region since lack of cheap energy resources has 
hampered mineral exploitation. 
Hydropower potential of the Region, 
The hydro-electric power potentials in the region under study 
are high and diverse, relative to the needs. Only one small-scale site 
has been studied and established at the Kelebe dam on the Ngona river, 
a tributary of the Kagera. Its installed capacity is 2.46 MW and an 
average annual production uf 14.9 Gwh/year. The Action Plan has re-
commended a thorough survey of the two country's sector of the Kagera 
32 
Basin. 
Burundi and Rwanda, because of their hilly terrain are much 
better endowed. The Action Plan has divided the potential sites into 
two broad categories: The main Hydro-power Projects and Other Projects. 
There are three projects under the first category, probably 
so characterized because of their inter-state implications which could 
have easily qualified them as regional projects, if the countries 
developed such an idea. On the other hand, they may be so characterized 
because of their structural inter-dependence. They are the Rusumo, 
Kishanda and Kakono sites where the Rusumo project would determine the 
32. Hydropowar potentials of the region are discussed in ibid pp. 
70-105. For comments on Tanzania and Uganda, see p.101. This 
situation understandably explains the special keennes with which 
Tanzania wants the Rusumo project implemented. 
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downstream construction. And the studies show their attributes as 
in Table II below: 






US$ x 10° 1 
Rusumo 80 270 130 
Kishanda 207 500 181 
Kakono 53 126 65 
-
•Costs are updated to 1981 rates. 
Additionally, there are several other possible sites located on 
the Kagera river in Rwanda 
the Kagera river in Rwanda and Burundi. Of the two countries, Burundi 
has a total of 32 established sites with installed capacity of 304.9MW 
and annual production estimated at 1,630.8 Gwh/year. The details for 
34 
each site are outlined in Table III below. 
The potential sites for Rwanda have also been studied, since 
1967. In all there are 15 established sites with total capacity of 
42 12 MW of installed power and guaranteed annual production estimated 
at 257.0 Gwh per year. Table IV below outlines the details for the 
35 
Rwanda sites. 
33. The structural inter-relation among the sites will be discussed 
later For details, see the consultants' report prepared by 
Trnctionol-Electrcbel on Commission from Belgian Government, 
Hydropower Development of Rusumo Falls. Economic Summary and 
Conclusions, June 1979. 
34. The data are from Volume 3 - Energy op.cit. Tables 5 on p. 39 
and Table 12 on p. 94 
35. The data are from ibid Tables 6 on p-40 and 13 on p.95. Note 
that "Rusumu" site on this table is a smaller site, located on 
the Rusumu river, a tributary of the Kagera. Other details of the. 
sites including heights- discharge rate and estimated costs are 
outlined on pp. 96-101. 
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TABLE III - HYDROPOWER POTENTIAL IN BURUNDI 
RIVER SITE 
• 
INSTALLED ANNUAL PRODUCTION j 
POWER Gwh/YR 
MW 
R U V U D U Gitega 25 117 
Mumwendo 30 157 
Murongwe 11 47.3 
Kitenge Rwegura IS 64 
Kagunuzi Masango 8 33 
Kabulantwa Rushiha 16 100 
Bitare 26.0 153.2 
Kagunuzi A 26.1 153.2 
Kagunuzi B 12.8 75.4 
Mpanda A 9.8 57.1 
B 1.7 12.3 
C 18 11.6 
D 3.9 23.0 
E 2.0 12.7 
Musazi Mubiinbi 1.8 13.3 
Mumc.su mo 1.7 12.2 
Rushubi 2.3 16.9 
Muzinda 3.5 25.6 
Ntahangwa Ntahangwa 4.0 32.2 
Kanyosha A 2.9 17.5 
B 4.S 30.0 
Mugere Mugert 8.0 48.4 
Karonge/ A 3.5 20.4 
Kirasa B 10.2 63.5 
C 6.1 38.4 
D 2.6 15.1 
E 12.6 73.5 
Ruzibazi A 1.8 10.3 
B 5.3 32.0 
C 6.1 39.1 
D 5.2 33.1 
E 14.2 92.8 
TOTAL 32 Sites 304.9 1,630.8 
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TABLE IV - HYDROPOWER POTENTIAL IN RWANDA 
Name of the Name of the Installed Power Annual Production 
River Site MW Gwh/Yr 
Rusumo kusumo 2.6 12.2 
Nyabarongo Nyabarongo 12.6 88.3 
Sebeya Gihira 1.0 8.1 
Sebeya Nyundo (Keya) 1.8 11.6 
Mukungwa Mukungwa II 2.9 14.6 
Base Base 3.4 19.7 
Akanyaru Akanyaru I 0.48 3.7 
Akanyaru Akanyaru II 2.0 16.1 
Rukarara Rukarara 6.4 23.5 
Ruhwa Ruhwa 6.0 35.0 
Kamiranzovu Kamiranzovu 0.7 5.3 
Karundura Karundura 1.3 11.4 
Ndaba Ndaba 0.24 2.1 
Nkora Nkora 0.15 0.6 
Satinsyi Satinsyi 0.55 4.8 
TOTAL 15 Sites 
• • 
42.12 257.0 
All the fifty bites, in Tables II, III and IV, have been 
carefully evaluated for purposes of the Action Plan. The studies 
concluded that while it will be appropriate to develop small-scale 
hydropower sites to meet local needs and to serve the reserve capacity 
and to meet peak locations, it was not practical to rely on them to 
meet the forcasted power demands. The economics involved were 
considered highly unfavourable and the length of transmission were 
excessive. 
Therefore, the Action Plan selected eight medium and large 
size sites for possible development to meet the demands upto the 
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year 2000. Table V outlines the. eight sites showing the years by 
which, according to the plans in 1982, production was expected to 
k *
 3 6 
begin. 
TABLE V - SITES PROPOSED FOR DEVELOPMENT TO YEAR 2000 









Rusumo Falls 80 270 130 1988 
Kakono 53 126 65 1989 
Gitega 25 117 54 1990 
j 
Kishanda 207 500 181 1992 
Nyabarongo 12.6 08.3 24.3 1996 
Mumwendo 30 157 83.5 1997 
Rukirara 6.4 23.5 1998 i 
Murongwe 11 47.3 24.4 1999 
TOTAL 425 1329.1 572.2 
j 
(1) Up-dated to 1981 prices. 
The Action Plan clarifies that the scheduled year of production 
was feasible only if feasibility and preinvestrnent studies commenced 
immediately. It will be recalled that it was only for Rusumo that 
detailed preinvestment studies had actually been done. There were 
adequate background studit-s done on the others, particularly Kakono, 
Kishanda and Gitega, however, detailed economic and engineering 
studies were still required. 
36. The data are from ibid Tables 7 on p. 42 and 14 on p. 102. 
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The Rusumo Controversy 
That it often takes a great deal of studies and reconsiderations 
before a well-identified hydropower potential is accepted for construction, 
is illustrated by the controversy which surrounded the Rusumo dam 
proposal. It has been explained here earlier that the Rusumo dam 
hydropower plan was so central to the consideration of the Rusumo agree-
ment that the dam plan could have been easily assumed as the first 
justification of the agreement. 
Those earlier surveys confirmed that Rusumo actually had an 
installed power capacity of 129MW, as distinct from 80MW in Tables 
II and V above. Accordingly the guaranteed output per year was 
also 535 Gwh as distinct from 270 Gwh shown above. Since, as has been 
pointed out above, the capacity of Rusumo would correspondingly affect 
Kishanda and Kakono schemes, their installed capacity were assessed 
at 214MW and 57MW respectively. 
But the plan for Rusumo at the maximum level was expected to 
innundate considerable tracts of agricultural land, a fact which was 
totally unacceptable to the densely populated Rwanda and Burundi. 
The two countries objected strainuously. Rwanda's Foreign Minister 
37 
Francois Ngarukiyitwali was reported to have told the press that 
the 129 MW capacity was actually pressed for by Tanzania, he stressed 
that his tiny and overpopulated country would have had to displace 
22,000 families and that they would lose 17,300 hectares of agricultural land. 
37. Reported in New Africa December 1981 p.68. More on this con-
troveisy will be discussed in the section on Environmental 
Implication of the Projects. For the detailed data in Table VI 
see Hydropower Development of Rusumo Falls (1979) op. cit p.6. 
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In the deliberations which followed, the three possible 
elevations for the dam, 1345, 1335 and 1325 meters were considered. 
The Tractionel-Electrobel study found that compared to Rusumo level 
at 1345 metres, the medium elevation of 1335m at Rusumo reduces the 
guaranteed power output at Kishanda by 20 percent and increases the 
cost of development by one per cent. For Kakono the respective 
figures are 20 per cent reduction and the cost of development increases 
by 2 percent. On the other hand at 1325 metres elevation at Rusumo 
the reduction in output at Kishanda is 51 percent and cost increases 
by 3 percent. The respective effects on Kakono are by 51 percent in 
output with development cost increased by 6 percent. Their respective 
power output as well as development costs are shown in Table VI. 
TABLE VI - VARIANTS LINKED WITH THE WATER SURFACE ELEVATION OF 
THE RUSUMO DAM 
I 
Installed Guaranteed Interannual Development 
power output output costs 
• MW Gwh/Yr Gwh/Yr 10° $ 
1. Rusumo 1345 129 535 597 115.9 
Kishanda 214 1,026 1,125 251 
Kakono 57 259 301 51 
Total 400 1,820 2,023 417.9 
2. Rusumo 1335 105 410 480 115.5 
Kishanda ,210 820 1,102 253.5 
Kakono 5 4 207 286 52 
Total 369 1,437 1,868 421.0 
3. Rusumo 1325 80 270 374 107.5 
Kishanda 207 500 1,082 258.5 
Kakono 53 126 277 54 
Total 340 896 1 1,733 420.0 
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Eventually the dam elevation of 1325 meters was accepted 
by the Heads of State of the KbO.member countries despite the relatively 
low energy gains. The point was that at that level the dam would 
displace the smallest number of people and innUndate the smallest area 
of agricultural land. 
Clearly, then even in the instances where the power capacity 
have been established there is no guarantee that they will be finally 
installed at the same levels. 
Power Transmission 
At the time the Action Plan was completed specific main power 
transmission lines.were proposed for Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania. 
The proposals were based on the projected needs at the main supply 
centres within the region. Table VII presents the links and the 
38 
estimated costs. 










Rusumo-Gitega-Bujumbura 150 220 25.17 
RWANDA 
Rusumo-Kibungo-Rwinkwavu-
Kigali 110 108 5.06 
TANZANIA 
Ru s umo-Mwanza 220 300 44.57 
Rusumo-Kyaka 132 150 15.07 
Kyaka-Bukoba 33 50 3.37 
Total 828 93.25 
38. Uganda for it^ part is actually doing major rehabilitation of 
Owen Falls dam and increasing the capacity of the power station 
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T These links are expected to be further modified as new load 
centres, particularly irrigation projects, mining ventures and 
industries emerge. It may also be affected by the possible connections 
to Uganda. This may actually arise from energy production at Kishanda 
and Kakono which are close to Western Uganda where supplies might 
reduce Uganda's long distance transmission from Owen Falls. It seems 
that further studies will be done before implementation of the proposed 
links. 
(b) Irrigated Agriculture 
The trend in the studies for agricultural development in the 
basin will have suggested a bias towards intensified farming practices 
in the rainfed sector ratner than in irrigation. However, it was also 
suggested, particularly in the critical study by Norbert Beyrard France, 
that there should be a clear balance between intensified rainfed 
agriculture and irrigation. This general hesitation to support large 
scale irrigation as the bias of KBO in its agricultural development 
also comes out clearly in the Action Plan finalized by the multi-
disciplinary-multi-donor mission, on irrigation matters. 
In their introductory pages the Action Plan on Irrigated 
39 
Agriculture observed as follows: 
38 continued: 
from 135 MW to 172MW. Financing has, been arranged through 
British Government, IBRD, CDC and Uganda Electricity Board to 
meet the required total amount of US $ 17.4 million. See 
Overseas Development. June 1985 p. 2. 
39. Development Programme of the Kagera Basin: Final Report Volume 
2 - Irrigated Agriculture. (Kigali: Kagera Basin Organization, 
February 1982) (Hereinacter Action Plan Volume 2 Irrigated 
Agriculture). p.53. 
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"Much of the Kagera River Basin agricultural land is 
not economically suited for irrigation, either because 
of poor soil, slope, distance and elevation differences to 
a dependable water supply. While not paramount, irrigation 
can play a real and effective role in increasing the land 
productivity and, thus, the basin food supply in the face 
i \ t 
of rapidly increasing production". 
Thus, the irrigation programme of KBO is seen more as a supplement 
to intensified rainfed agriculture. And due to the adverse conditions 
mentioned above it should be borne In mind that even the selected 
areas, are not always the best circumstances for irrigated agriculture. 
It is with such caution in mind that the KBO actually decided 
on the balance between rainfed and irrigated agriculture and, 
ultimately, the selection of the number of areas of planned imple-
mentation of irrigation in each of the three original members of the 
organization. 
Initially seven project areas were studied by the multi-
disciplinary-multi-donor mission. However, only three were retained 
in the Action Plan, for implementation. Table VIII below outlines 
40 
both categories. 
Three, out of seven originally proposed project areas is 
rather small. But there are, presumably, four major and inter-
related factors which determined the choice. First, it was already 
made clear that the KBO was more inclined towards intensification of 
i!- , < •
 ;
 • •) • 
rainfed rather than irrigated agriculture. Secondly, the Action Plan 
has made it clear that most of the Kagera Basin is not very suitable 
40. ibid pp. 6 and 8. 
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TABLE VIII - AREAS FOR IRRIGATION 
Areas Proposed for Irrigation Area Retained 
1. Nyamswaga-Buyongwe (Burundi) Bugesera (Rwanda) 
2. Kanzigiri and Nyamaboni (Burundi) Rusumo Covette (Burundi) 
3. Bugesera Area (Nkanga-Rwanda) Kyaka/Kakono (Tanzania) 
4. Rusumo Covetter (Rwanda 
5. Borders of Rusumo dam (Rwanda) 
6. Kyaka/Kakono (Tanzania) 
7. Ikimba Area (Tanzania) ; 
for irrigation, at least not for reasonable economic returns. Therefore, 
the contracting states were likely to be cautions about the rrmge of 
irrigation activities that thay might take up from the outset. Thirdly, 
irrigated agriculture requires a great deal of education, experience 
and discipline. With the minor experience of Kagera Sugar Company 
in Tanzania's lower basin, there Is no notable experience with 
irrigation in the basin. And in Africa generally, the success with 
irrigation in Egypt and Sudan has not been matched in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. In fact, the experience of SAED in Senegal and SONADER in 
41 
Mauritania - both in the Senega] basin show the same kind of dismal 
record as is, say The National Irrigation Board in Kenya. For these 
reasons, it seems pertinent that KBO should commence its work with 
a limited number and, thereafter, to establish its own success record 
before more projects are taken on. Irrigation is, by its very nature 
a very expensive enterprise. Fourthly, even with the three projects 
41! See critical comments by Adrian Adams in "The Senegal River 
Valley: What Kind of change?" Review of .African Political 
Economy No. 10 Sept-December 1977 pp. 33-59 and OMVS, Social and 
Economic Study on the Senegal River Basin: General Report. Part 
C. Introduction of Irrigated Agriculture in the Senegal River 
Basin (Dakar, MVS High Commission April 1900. 
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retained for implementation the planned duration for implementation 
is quite long. In total, the three projects will cover approximately 
24,200 hectares and it is anticipated that it will take at least 10 
42 
years to complete. 
For corapletness, let us outline brief the three areas selected 
for irrigation in the basin. The Bugesera Irrigation Project is 
located in Nkanga area, approximately 45 kilometers to the south of 
43 
Kigali, but to the west of Lake Rugwero or Bugesera. The soils 
in the area are rather poor and unproductive, suitable only for 
-limited .scale grazing. It is expected that with irrigation and 
additional inputs the crop yields would be increased. 
The gross area is approximately 1,130 hectares, but the portion 
slated for irrigation is 1,000 hectares, constituting a 'model' along 
the shoreline of the existing Lake Bugesera. Sprinkler irrigation 
has been selected for the project with the investment and construction, 
all to be completed during the first year; production to commence 
during the second year at 60 per cent yields. The yields are expected 
to increase at the rate of 10 per cent per annum with full production 
to be realized by the sixth year. Already, laboratory type research 
has yielded soim. estimates for possible returns from irrigated, as 
44 
against rainfed practices (Table IX). 
42. , See Action Plan Volume 2 irrigated Agriculture. 
43. information on Bugesera project is in ibid pp. 57-58 and 
68-94. 
44. See ibid p. 71. 
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TABLE IX - COMPARATIVE MAXIMUM YIELDS FOR IRRIGATED AND RAINGROWN 
CROPS OBTAINED AT KARAMA RESEARCH STATION 





















2,189 1,050 20 43,780 21,000 +22,780 
Soya Palmete 
(Dry Grain) 
3,052 725 20 61,040 14,500 •+46,540 
GRNDS Fatui 
(Unshelled) 
3,563 1,500 25 89,075 37,500 +51,575 
Maize Bambou 
(Dry Grain 
5,678 3,150 10 56,780 31,500 +25,280 
Cotton 
(Seed CTN) 
2,520 1,250 16 40,320 20,000 +20,320 
The anticipated yields are contingent on certain agricultural in-
puts, and with considerable labour input, contributed by the farmers. 
The system will be comprised of family farms, settled on 
seventeen, 60 hectare blocks, each with a 6 hectare infrastructure. But 
in most cases, they will all be trained in irrigation skills, and other 
inputs if the yields are to be realized. 
The Rusumo Covette Irrigation Project originally identified by 
45 
Tractionel in 1979, covered 10,400 hectares. The purpose was to 
compensate for agricultural land innundated by the backwaters of the 
Rusumo dam, within Nyabarongo valley, particularly if the dam level 
was elevated to 1345 meters. The same area had been earmarked for 
development of Paysannot Settlement immediately after independence, to 
ease the pressure on the other crowded agricultural lands in Rwanda. 
However, due to persistently low rainfall that scheme failed and most 
of the original settlers abandoned the projects. 
45. For information on Rusumo Covette, see ibid pp. 56-57 and 
95-150. 
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Eventually, the KBO Action Plan adopted the project for 4,550 
hectares of which 2,655 hectares would be intensely irrigated by 
sprinkler system using pumps driven by electricity from Rusumo dam, 
46 
or diesel driven pumps. The choice of areas for actual operation 
were to be limited by elevation, to moderate the cost of pumping. 
Areas over 1,400 meters elevation were eliminated as were also areas 
where the soil was particularly inferior. To further reduce the 
pumping heads and distance for water service, the project area was 
divided into three system areas, designated as A, B and C and with 
detailed coverage as in Table X. 
TABLE X - AREAS OF PROJECT 
Area Gross Area Under 







A 1,320 1,190 770 420 
B 1,800 1,620 1,055 565 
C 1,430 1,290 840 450 
4,550 4,100 2,665 1,435 
It is to be noted from table X that of the entire Rusumo 
Cuvette area, only 2,655 hectares would be intensively irrigated, 
with the rest only partially or on supplementary irrigation. The 
intensively irrigated area would be for the resettlement of 1,700 
families, out of a total of 2,730 families which were expected to be 
48 




ibid p. 56 
ibid p. 98 
ibid pp. 56, 97 and 105 
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1.5 hectares net cultivated area the total Cuvette should accommodate 
the 2730 families, with an additional five hectares as demonstration or 
seed multiplication units. Eventually, the resettled population would, 
be given the requisite agricultural inputs and irrigation education, 
contribute to the necessary food production schemes. But it is ex-* 
pected that the fertilizer quantities required would be substantial 
given the poor quality of the soil, The crops intended for the area 
are largely beans, sorghum, groundnuts, maize,cassava, sweet potatoes 
and bananas, with selected areas reserved for fodder crops. 
Given the requisite inputs the yields are anticipated to be 
higher in the project area than without the project, as projected in 
Table XI below. The projected yield "without project" is with part 
irrigation to supplement low or erratic rainfall. 
If there are no serious hitches the whole project should be 
completed in approximately seven years. 
TABLE XI - PROJECTED CROP YIELD 
Crop 
.•• - - - • 
With Project 
tons per ha. 
Without Project 
tons per ha. 
Beans 2.0 0.63 
Sorghum 2.5 1.04 
Groundnuts 1.5 0.84 
Cassava 12.0 8.0 
Sweet Potatoes 8.0 6.0 
Bananas 10.0 9,0 
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The Kyaka/Kakono Irrigation Project is located in Tanzania's 
Kagera region in a general area comprising 50,000 hectares to the north 
and south of Kagera River, between Kyaka trading centre and Kakono 
49 
dam site. It was first given a detailed study by the Norconsult/ 
Electrowatt investigation in 1976 when an area of 21,440 hectares 
on the right bank of the Kagera River was earmarked for irrigation 
to grow maize, soya beans and rice. And it was envisaged, indeed 
to be irrigated by gravity canals after pumping water from Kagera 
River, at a location near Kakono, hopefully to utilize hydropower 
from Kakono dam. 
Eventually, the project proposal was reviewed and revised, to 
take into account the topography, soil quality for irrigation, costs 
and other pertinent features. Additionally, the choice of location 
had to take into account the five agricultural projects existing in 
the area, namely: Mwisa and Misenyi Ranch complexes; Kitangule Ranch; 
Kitangule Prison Farm; Kagera Sugar Estate; and Agricultural 
Research Services.^ Thus, the final area adopted in the Action Plan 
for irrigation is about 16,800 hectares, but the crops for the project 
remained the same. The conclusion of the multi-disciplinary-multi-donor 
mission was that "(t)he Kyaka Irrigation Project is by any 
standard of measure a bankable project.""^ 
As distinct from the other project areas the Kyaka/Kakono 
irrigation project was to be situated in an area of existing ex-
perimental activities, including irrigation, from which it stood 
49. ibid p. 58 and 169-202. 
50. For the existing projects, see pp. 175-77 and interviews with 
officials of the Sugar Development Corporation of Tanzania. 
51. ibid p. 226. 
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to benefit. The five projects, listed above, are described briefly, 
as follows:"'" 
The Mwisa and Misenyi Ranch complexes are immediately adjacent 
to the irrigation project area, to the southwest. Mwisa alone covers 
approximately 120,000 hectares and has a total of about 12,500 head of 
cattle. Misenyi ranch together with its areas of planned expansion 
is about 540,000 hectares but it was completely destocked during the 
Uganda-Tanzania border clashes in Amin's era. 
Kitangule Ranch, established in 1964, is to the south of the 
river Kagera, and to the south of the Misenyi ranch. The original 
plan envisaged 47,460 hectares,for about 31,640 livestock on the whole 
ranch. Substantial parts of the ranch will now fall within the 
Irrigation Project area but significant portions will remain in the 
periphery for the continued ranching. This would possibly lead to 
i ' ? • 
intensive beef production as crop residues and irrigated forage is 
used in zero-grazing as a complement to conventional ranching. 
The Kitangule Prison Farm occupies an area approximately 1,680 
hectare, of which 890 hectare is within the area of the Irrigation Project. 
Upto now, the two crops grown in rotation in the farm are'maize and 
beans, at the rate of one crop per year, but some 26 hectare have been 
under vegetable and root crop production. 
The Kagera Sugar Estate is situated on the left bank of the 
Kagera river and is comprised of 5^000 hectares of cane with an additional 
350 hectares with supplementary sprinkler irrigation. But the
:
experience 
of Kagera Sugar Company has forcefully demonstrated some of the problems 
of irrigated agriculture in the region. 
52. ibid pp. 175-177. 
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The original plan conceived in 1972 was to farm a grosj area 
of 14,000 hectares on rainfed basis, and to produce 56,000 tons of 
sugar per year with the capacity to expand to 80,000 tons per year. 
However, on closer examination the project was found to be risky: 
rains were unreliable; the soil was rather too sandy, meaning low 
water retention capacity; development on both sides of the bridge which 
was prohibitively costly; and a large part of the area was already 
in Kitangule ranch. 
That is when the plan for irrigation was designed, scaled down 
to 6,500 hectares. And initially 4,500 hectares was planted with sugar 
cane. Although water was abundant in Kagera river, the pumping device 
became a problem. The plan was to derive the energy from burning 
bagasse to.create steam for power. In fact, the power generated did 
not reach the seven megawatts capacity required for the total of -6,500 
hectares. On the other hand, a thermal generator to use diesel which 
was recommended was found to be economically unfeasible. At the 1980 
prices it was estimated that the entire irrigation infrastructure would 
cost approximately 400 million Tanzanian shillings of which 93 million 
shillings would go to construction of the power station alone. 
Therefore, the irrigation plan had to be set aside. And this is 
where, the link between irrigation in the Kagera Region of Tanzania 
and the KliO hydropower, particularly 53 megawatts planned for Kakono 
dam, become apparent. Authorities at the Sugar Development Corporation, 
in Tanzania, estimate that Kagera Sugar Company alone would need 
approximately 10 megawatts. 
For purposes of the KBO, projects could also use the facilities 
of the Kyakakera Pilot Farm, a research station established in 1971 
to provide information on crop performance in Kyaka region, particularly 
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under irrigated conditions. Upto the time of the multi-disciplinary-
multi-donor mission the centre had produced little information, but 
could conceivably be activated by a serious KBO. 
The KBO irrigation project would evidently work out a proper 
delineation of boundaries with the Kagera Sugar Company, which is a 
private firm, before the implementation stage. For while the private 
company is primarily interested in Sugar production, KBO intends to 
concentrate on food crops, particularly maize, soya beans and rice, 
perhaps with some inter-cropping intended for maize and beans. At any 
rate the Action Plan anticipated that during the ninth year the pro-
duction should reach 47,000 tons for maize, 14,100 tons for soya < 
beans and 46,900 tons for rice, from net areas of 9,400 hectares, 
53 
9,400 hectares and 13,400 hectares, respectively. 
In final analysis it seems that the most extensive area for 
irrigated agriculture in the KBO programme will be in the Tanzanian 
section. The Rusumo Cuvette project will be largely imposed on KBO 
by the necessity to settle people displaced by inundation caused 
by Rusumo dam. But like the Bugesera project, it will be largely a 
supplementation of rainfed agricultural project. 
In the Tanzanian section the Kyaka/Kakono projects highlights 
the agony of Tanzania both for want of increased food production, and 
for the need for alternative and renewable sources of energy, away 
53. ibid, p. 199. There seems to be an anomaly in the total 
acreage since the total project area was given as 16,800 
hectare only. Even if maize and soya beans were inter-planted, 
which is not certain, the total area here would be beyond that 
for the project. 
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from imported hydrocarbons. Other than the regularly high cost of 
imported fuel oil, the distance over which it has to be transported 
magnifies the cost to prohibitive proportions. This problem applies 
to worse degrees in the case of Rwanda and Burundi. And therefore, 
all the irrigation projects planned by KBO are inextricably linked 
to the hydropower schemes, clearly, with the latter leading the way. 
(c) Rainfed Agriculture 
The primary occupation of 98 per cent of the population in the 
Kagera basin is agriculture. And, as has been clear from the fore-
going section the agricultural practice has been entirely rainfed. 
For the most densely populated countries in Africa, this means that; 
most of the land in the region would not be introducing a new culture, 
54 
but instead intensifying the existing agricultural activities. 
Three specific areas, one in each of the three original KBO 
member countries, have been selected for the intensified rainfed 
agricultural projects: 
In Burundi, the area is the District of Karuzi, in Gitega 
Province, directly to the north of GItega town. The area involved 
is about 20,000 hectares covering the communes of Buhiga and Bugenyuzi, 
where some 8,000 families of about 40,000 inhabitants live as farming 
communities. The average annual precipitation in the area is 1,200 mm 
with an average of 160 days of rain per year, distributed over most 
of the year. On the average there is good agricultural soil which is 
distributed among various crops farmed at small-holder level. The 
54. The projects in Rainfed Agriculture is discussed in Development 
of the Kagera Basin: Final Report. Volume I Rainfed agriculture 
(Kigali: KBO, February 1982) (Hereinafter Final Report: Rainfed 
Agriculture). 
55. ibid pp. 46, 203-269 
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crops include bananas, sweet potatoes, cassava, beans, peas, ground-
nuts, soya beans, maize, sorghum and millet. Some vegetables are 
also grown, but the main cash crops are coffee and tobacco. 
The average farm size is 2.2 hectares,of which 1.7 hectares 
are on the slpes and 0.5 hectares are in the swampy areas. To support 
the crop yields, there is a seed multiplication centre located at 
Rusamaza in the area. 
There is a limited 37,000 hectares for pastures in the region. 
And for the two communes there are approximately 10,000 head of 
cattle, 24,000 sheep and goats and 18,000 chickens. To boost or 
maintain the livestock part of the project will have to boost fodder 
production and increase veterinary services. 
In Rwanda"^ the project area is the Prefecture of Butare to 
cover the communes of Kibayi and Muganza to the northeast of the 
prefectorate. The areas covered are 12,074 hectares for Kibayi and 
10,559 hectares for Muganza. 
' " ... ji' '. 
The average annual rainfall for the area ranges between 1200 mm 
and 1400 mm distributed over two rainy seasons of each year. And the 
' ' -v ' I • * l "1 ' f O 
terrain is made up of ridges and hills whose average altitude is 
1500 meters above the sea level. 
The alluvial soil in the area varies in quality as well as 
t j'' • • . ) . 
water holding capacity, and the variation has been increasingly 
accentuated by the ongoing soil erosion, which reduces nutrients. 
Although the French/Rwandan project started in the region in 
• t f.. . . , . , : . • ; i ' ' 1-. .. ' 
1977 has encouraged farmers to grow peanuts and soya beans the 
56. ibid pp. 68-122 
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traditional subsistance farmers have habitually grown bananas, sorghum, 
sweet potatoes, cassava and maize, with coffee as the only cash crop 
for export. Definitely, the pressure on land and the need to enhance 
productivity of the land is accentuated by the high density of popu-
lation, averaging 297 per square kilometres with an annual rate of 
increase at 3.0 per cent. More agronomic research is aimed at increasing 
productivity of the land, is done at Rubona Research Station located 
in the project area. 
Livestock, which relies on the fallow land is lower in number 
than in the Karuzi project area. The present holding includes 
9,000 bovine, 1,900 sheep, 10,000 goats, 1,800 pigs, 9,300 poultry 
and 1,200 rabbits. Perhaps more could be raised with better knowledge 
of the extent of the fallow area and veterinary services. 
Tanzania's project ^ for rainfed agriculture is in Ikimba-
Misenyi area of Kagera Region, neighbouring on the east with the Kyaka/ 
Kakono irrigation project discussed above. It stretches from the 
southern end of Lake Ikimba to the border of Tanzania and Uganda, 
where the rainfall is generally low averaging 800 to 850 mm, except 
for the narrow belt along Lake Victoria where the rainfall reaches 
2,000 mm. 
This is an exceptionally sparsely populated part of the kKagera 
basin. The total population of Kagera Region of Tanzania is 1,009,291 
which corresponds to approximately 35 pe pie per square kilometer. 
Most of them are engaged in small-holder agriculture, growing plain-
tains, sorghum, beans, maize, sweet potatoes and cassava, mainly for 
subsistence. But coffee and tea are the main cash crops. So far, 
57. ibid pp. 128-202 
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no detailed statistics for the cropped areas are available, even 
though rough estimates suggest that. 2.2 hectares are the average 
cultivated area per family in the region. All these suggest that a 
great deal of development statistics should be gathered in this 
area to support intensified agricultural activities. 
According to the Action Plan, the actual intensification of 
rainfed agriculture in the three areas will entail the following 
58 
very specific actions: ° (1) protection and reclamation of soils 
to ensure productive quality; (2) production and dissemination of 
selected seeds at the same time; (3) extension of agricultural me-
thodologies; (4) intensification and development of subsistence 
crops; (5) intensification and development of commercial crops; 
(6) association of livestock and agriculture; (7) social and economic 
organization of the farmers; (8) adhering to the economics of pro-
duction; (9) intensification of support actions of logistics and 
infrastructure. 
It is understood here that a vital production item like 
fertilizers is actually implied under the rubric of reclamation of 
• ' i 
soils to ensure productive quality. In fact, given the recurrent 
observation about the generally poor quality of the soil in the basin, 
fertilizer input may be the most crucial factor in the enhancement of 
agricultural productivity. In the case of rainfed agriculture, it 
is projected that over the initial 5 to 7 project years productivity 
r • i 
for the various crops should increase by 25 to 30 per cent, provided 
that well-trained and experienced personnel are deployed in the 
59 
Implementation. 
58. Listed in ibid p. 45. 
59. ibid pp. 43-44. 
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It is also observed that in both, the rainfed and irrigated 
projects special emphasis has been placed on production of food crops, 
with what seems as only casual mention of cash crops. At least in the 
case of Rwanda it is explicitly stated that price incentives were 
provided for oil seeds, particularly peanuts and that the French/ 
Rwandan project had actually started an oil factory in 1977. 
Apart from the focus on manpower training and fertilizers the 
Action Plan lays special emphasis on agricultural credit system for 
financing of farmers, and marketing machinery to provide efficient 
outlets of the farm p r o d u c e . ^ Storage and conservation are considered 
an essential component of marketing system. 
(d) Other Project Sectors 
Other project sectors discussea in cne ncuiuii n a n u l c 
development, Forestry and Fisheries. 
Several references have been made to livestock, almost as if 
it is a clear component part of irrigated or rainfed agriculture. That 
arises largely because the very agricultural activities are expected 
to produce most of the animal feeds. It is a critical question, of 
course, that livestock might not find much accommodation In the areas 
of exceptionally high density of human population as are Rwanda and 
Burundi. In general a number of factors have threatened the livestock 
population in the entire basin area. There have been inadequate 
nutrition; vector diseases especially from tsetse flies; heavy losses 
due to diseases and internal parasites; and inadequate veterinary care 
due to lack of funds, personnel and equipment. 
60. For Agricultural Credit in Burundi and Rwanda see ibid pp. 270-
301 and for marketing in the two countries, see ibid pp. 302-
338 where cooperatives are recommended as an important institu-
tional machinery for organized marketing. 
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And these factors can drastically reduce the number of stocks. 
For instance during the 1978-79 about 15,000 out of 131,000 hfeads 
of cattle in Rwanda and Burundi were lost. Yet the member states 
> i >,• 
recognize the value of the animals for nutrition as well as possible 
leather industry in the region. What the project intends to develop 
is a careful balance in the land holding capacity as well as for 
crop-product ion. 
Afforestation is required within the basin for several reasons, 
particularly, soil and catchment conservation, poles and timber for 
building industry and for fuel-wood. The objective of the project is to 
{Slant 10,000 hectares of forests in each of the three countries to 
meet the above purposes. 
Fisheries development within the basin is highly envisaged, . 
partly because KBO members are conscious of their wealth in water 
bodies. Apart from the Tanzanian part, of the Lake Victoria which is 
approximately 50 per cent, Burundi and Rwanda, respectively have 
26,460 and 15,465 hectares of lakes. The present fish catch potential, 
in Rwanda is approximately 1270 tonnes per year and for Burundi, upto 
f I i' ' 
1550 tonnes per year. In actual fact, Rwanda's annual catch is only 
621 tonnes pet year; for Burundi, it Is 155 tonnes per year. 
The value of fish as a source of nutrition for national' population 
as well as its place in trade is well established. Within Kagera area 
it is estimated that the total animal protein available is approximately 
6.1. The following information on fisheries programme of KBQ is iV • ' 
derived from Development Programme of the Kagera basin. 
Final Report Volume 5 Industries; Health and Environment., (Kigali: 
KBO February 1982) (Hereinafter Final Report - Volume 5 
Industries, Health and Environment) pp. 36-46. 
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4,000 tons when the actual need in the region is about 38,000 tons. 
It is obvious, therefore, that KBO could stimulate development in the 
fisheries sector to take advantage of the vast potential currently 
unexploited, as well as possibilities of aquaculture in ponds. 
Table XII shows the status of fisheries sector in the whole basin. 
TABLE XII - STATUS OF FISHERY RESOURCES 
Lakes Area Altitude Potential Present 
Ha. m. productivity productivity 
t/yr tons 
Rwanda 
jBulera 2,610 1,962 50-60 93 
!Luhondo 5,280 1,764 50-60 31 
Muhazi 3,410 ±1,450 100-300 97 
Mugesera 3,920 ±1,340 350-400 65 
Birila 540 ±1,540 38 -
Sake 1,430 id 128 21 
Gashanga 230 id 16 17 
Muago 220 id 16 4 
Rumira 280 id 20 19 
Mirayi 230 id 16 4 
Kilimbi 260 id 16 10 
Gaharwa 230 id 16 30 
Rweru *2,230 1,324 165 16 
Cyohoha N. 610 ±1,345 43 27 
Cyohoha S. 630 1,351 45 16 
Rwampanga 950 ±1,290 100 58 
' Rwehikana 2,160 ±1,290 42 15 
'Nasho 1,300 ±1,290 62 98 
26,460 1,273 621 
!Burundi 
Rugwero *8,000 1,324 600-800 50 (1) 
Cyohoha *6,125 1,351 460-615 60 
Kanzigiri 750 1,324 56-75 15 
'Katahamiranda 340 - 19-25 5 
Rwihinda 250 - 34-42 25 
15,465 1,170-1,557 155 
Tanzania 
Rwakajungwe 3,000 _ 149 
Bisongo 2,500 - 124 
Burigi 7,500 - 373 
Ikimba 5,000 - 248 
:Rushwa 4,500 - 224 
iVictoria 3,370,000 73,375 
i 3,392,500 74,493 
*partially in Rwanda and Burundi 
62. ibid. 
63. ibid p. 36,46 
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Apart from the resources in the natural lakes there are 
potentials for development of fisheries in the reservoirs created by 
the hydro-electric power dams. For instance, at the 1325 meters 
elevation a reservoir of approximately 20,200 hectares, will be created 
in the Nyabarongo valley. The Action Plan has called for detailed studies 
of the suitable species for the reservoir, and the organization of 
the communities for their exploitation. This should provide one of the 
ways for creating employment as well as boosting the livelihood for the 
people displaced by the dam - much like is intended for settlement in 
irrigated farms in Rusumo Cuvette. 
2. Transport and Communication 
The primacy of transport and communication in the development plans 
r .. « . - • . 
of the Kagera basin were briefly underscored in Chapter II above. The land-
locked condition as well as the great distances from the oceans exacer-
bates the already bad economic condition of the region, as much for 
Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, as for northwestern Tanzania. 
64 
The Final Report on Transportation for KBO states that the 
straight line distance from the basin to the Indian Ocean is 1,000 kilo-
meters and 1,900 kilometers from the Atlantic. And the port of Dar es 
Salaam is 1,430 kilometers by rail/lake links from Bujumbura, while 
Kigali is 1740 kilometers from Mombasa by road. 
The KBO Background Reports in 1979 estimated that the cost of 
transportation is approximately US $250 per tonne. And the volume of the 
freight is expected to increase fourfold, from 260,000 tonnes in 1975 to ' . i.? . 
64. For the information on Transportation, see Development Programme 
of the Kagera Basin. Final Report. Volume 4 Transport (Kigali: 
KBO, February 1982) (Hereinafter Final Report Volume 4 Transport). 
For these distances see p.26. 
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one million tonnes by the year 2000. The cost might look rather 
ominous when are considered also in the context of the distances above. 
Even under the best of circumstances that is an expensive way 
to run an economy. But internal transportation within the basin is by 
roads all of which are either earth or gravel surfaced and are all in 
poor conditions. There are no existing railways links within the basin. 
The countries of the basin cannot do much about their land-locked 
condition. They can only seek to diversify the alternative transport 
routes and to improve their quality for efficiency. 
The trade and service transactions among neighbouring states, to 
the magnitude envisaged above, requires also formidable telecommunica-
tion links. As it is now the telecommunication links between 
Budnmhura or Kigali with Dar es Salaam, depend on the European circuits 
located in,000- kilometers. away. 
For purposes of their external trade Rwanda depends largely on the 
Kigali-Kampala-Mombasa route, popularly known as the "Northern Corridor". 
Most of it is by road, even though it is the railway line from Kampala 
to Mombasa which is often used. Burundi also uses that route to a small 
extent. But their main route, as well as for eastern Zaire is Dar es 
Salaam to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika, then by boat from Kigoma to 
Bujumbura. 
Perhaps because of the terrain in the Congo-Nile divide as well 
as for reasons of distance, the governments of the basin states have 
put high priority on the links to the Indian Ocean, improving on the 
above, as well as providing additional optional routes. A particular 
attention is on maximizing links with the East African railway system. 
The "Middle Corridor" is to link northern Burundi and central 
Rwanda to Kemondo Bay for a ferry terminal on Lake Victoria, then to 
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Mwanza to the Mwanza-Dar es Salaam line or to Musoma to link up with 
the proposed Musomal-Arusha-Tanga line. 
The "Southern Line" would link southern Burundi from Gitega 
to Uvinza then to Kigoma-Dar es Salaam line. The proposition is that the 
area between Gitega and Rusumo, and westwards would partly be served 
by the "Middle" route, should the need arise. This proposition is 
further strengthened by the fact that over-crowiing and over-use of Dar 
es Salaam and Mombasa will probably continue, or get worse. And that 
may give increasing prominence to the Middle Corridor with the steady 
of expansion of Tanga Port especially if Tanzania decides to grant 
"free port" arrangements for the land-locked states. 
At the end of the multi-disciplinary-multi-donor mission the 
KBO member states had agreed to the construction of a network for 
external links, consisting of the following: 
Uvinza-Musongati-Gitega-Buyongwe-Rusumo Falls 








In general these railway links will provide effective outlets to 
the Indian Ocean ports. But additionally they are designed to serve major 
66 
development projects, particularly: Mosso Sugar project at Giofi; 
65. See ibid pp. 29t30. 
66. ibia pp. 28-29 
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Musongati nickel mines; Kabanga nickel and cobalt deposits; industries 
planned around Gisenyi on Lake Kivu; Lake Nosho agro-industrial complex; 
Mwisa and Misenyi ranching projects; Kyaka/Kakono irrigation project; 
Kyaka Sugar Estate; iron ore deposits at Kabale in south-western 
Uganda; Buyongwe peat deposits; the basin portion of Uganda; and other 
possible agro-based projects. 
It is generally argued that basic infrastructure like railways 
should go where existing economic activities justify it. Conversely, 
it can be argued, conversely, that it is such infrastructure that 
could open up certain areas to development activities. Some of the 
locations listed above already have economic activities while others are 
still in plan. Nevertheless, it is possible to evaluate and project 
the volumes of freight anticipated forthese project areas, thus to 
further justify the planned construction, as shown in Table XIII. 
TABLE XIII - CONTINGENT VOLUME EVALUATE BY KBO FOR THE YEAR 2000 
Project Volume in Tons 
Musongati Nickel 40,000 
Giofi Sugar 20,000 
Buyongwe Peat 900,000 
Kabanga Nickel/Cobalt 30,000 
Mwisa/Misenyi Ranches 10,000 
Kyaka/Kakono Irrigation 100,000 
Kyaka Sugar Estate 50,000 
Gisenyi Area Industries 50,000 
Lake Nasho Agricultural Complex 20,000 
Other Projects 30,000 
Southern Uganda Developments 100,000 
Total Contingent Traffic 1,350,000 




It may be envisaged that at certain levels of efficiency these 
lines will probably attract more freight to and from Kivu in Eastern 
Zaire. But the planning and construction of the lines will also entail 
some careful coordination with the eastern African states especially 
for standardization of railway gauges, rolling stocks and engines. 
Roads have often been constructed as complements to the railway 
lines. However, only roads can penetrate the countries in greater 
detail including areas where the cost of railway construction and 
servicing would be prohibitive. Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda, 
have actually planned what they call first priority roads with total 
68 
length of 1,227 kilometers, as shown in Table XIV below. 
The map below gives the schematic outline of the proposed roads 
in the Lake Victoria circuit only. But the important point is that 
the roads, like the railways, are routed through the major areas of 
planned development projects in agriculture, mining or industries. 
The KBO plans are that the entire roads network be constructed 
over a six year period, all phased out for different priority roads. 
The Question of Transit 
Whether the route taken by the land-locked states is "northern", 
"middle" or "southern" circuits, the basic concerns of the states are 
efficiency, in terms of cost-effectiveness; convenience; and alter-
natives when all else are found unfeasible for political or other 
reasons. Additionally, the basin states may also prefer a route for 
reasons of promoting inter-state trade and services and, therefore, 
regional integration of socio-economic transactions. 
68. ibid p. 123. For the schematic Map, see p. 127. 
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TABLE XIV - FIRST PRIORITY ROADS AS IDENTIFIED BY THE KBO 
i 
Country Roads Distance in Km. 
BURUNDI Gisenyi-Muyange Alt. A 73 
Alt. B (50) 
Ngozi-Gitega 81 




TANZANIA Mtukula-Bukoba-Biharamulo 260 
Biharamulo-Lusahunga 31 
Kyaka-Bugene-Rusumo Falls 200 
Kobero-Rulenge-Nyakahura 85 
UGANDA Kyotera-Mutukula 41 
Kakitumba-Ntungano 35 
Cy anika-Kab a le 66 
Gatuna-Kabale 21 
TOTAL 1227 
Tanzania may, for instance, meet for both Rwanda and .Burundi only 
part of the basic concerns mentioned above. Yet, within the framework 
of the KBO, Tanzania may appeal to the land-locked states as the ideal 
route, that is through the middle and southern corridors, because they 
may want to strengthen the integrative functions enhanced by increased 
i . • i
 1 
trade and services. And if that was the case, then Tanzania might, in 
fact encourage the use of the routes through its state. 
Such an argument would also presuppose that there are economic 
benefits to be derived from being a transit state. Generally, the 
transit state would have the disadvantage of frequent repairs to roads 
over-worked by heavy commercial traffic. The requirements under the 
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1921 Barcelona Convention, and the York Convention on the Transit 
Trade of Land-Locked States Concluded at New York on July 8, 1965 
affirm the "freedom of transit" for the land-locked state subject 
only to special regulations including charges levied to defray the 
69 
expenses of supervision and administration of such transit. Never-
theless such agreements are subject to accession or ratification of 
the respective states and thereafter adherence to the spirit of the 
agreement may be a different matter. 
Tanzania as a coastal and transit state would be obliged to 
permit access for the land-locked KBO member states, regardless of 
the 1965 New York Convention, which it did not sign or ratify. 
Tanzania is presumed to be committed to further the transport goals 
within the framework of the KBO agreement. Perhaps the land-locked 
member states would be inclined towards the route if all else is equal. 
In this connection, the experience reported from Burundi in 1983 seems 
instructive.'^ The country had in 1979 imposed a tax on all freights 
transported from Dar es Salaam through the railway line, where the 
tax was to help defray the costs owed by Burundi to Tanzania, for the 
handling, including air-freighting from Dar es Salaam. 
In the end, this caused a decline of goods traffic to Burundi, 
through Tanzania, to decline from 95 to 40 per cent over four years as 
the businessmen took alternative routes, largely through Mombasa. 
69. See Articles 2 and 3 of the New York Convention reprinted in 
United Nations, Treaty Series Vol. 597 (1967) pp. 42-62. 
70. This was reported in Daily Nation, (Nairobi) 28 February 
1983 p.16. 
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The effect is that Tanzania lost whatever revenues accrued from handling 
of goods at the port; at the same time Burundi was forced to take a 
longer and more costly route, That situation was changed in February 
1983 when Mr. Remmy Nkengerute, the Burundi Minister for Transport 
and Communication announced the removal of the tax. 
For Kenya the situation is only similar in that it is a transit 
state and that Mombasa becomes a congested port partly because of the 
freight it handles for the three land-locked KBO member states- Apart 
from not being a KBO member state like Tanzania, Kenya is also not a 
contracting party to the 1965 New York Convention. Therefore, it allows 
the transit partly as a matter of comity or partly in adherence to 
the general principles of international law recognized by civilized nations, 
within the meaning of Article 38(1) (b) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice. 
The third and perhaps more pragmatic reasoniinducing Kenya to 
grant transit to the land-locked states is if Kenya derives revenues or 
trade opportunities from the transit through its territory. This 
matter has been the subject of several high level negotiations between 
Kenya and the land-locked states, with negligible substantive in-
formation published yet. In particular, the discussions became 
protracted after press reports that a Kenya Central Bank Circular of 
November 1983 had actually required all transit fees for the states to 
be paid in foreign currency and a February 1985 report that Kenya 
might, if fact, lose revenues which would accrue from handling of 
transit cargo bound for the hinterland states.^
1 
j ! ••, • 
71. See "Transit fees to be paid in hard cash" in Sunday Nation 
(Nairobi) November 6, 1983 p. 24. and "Kenya May Lose Trade" 
in Daily Nation, February 14, 1985 p. 24 
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Indeed, the consultations with the states has been broadly based 
including also direct trade between them and Kenya with export opportu-
nities which the latter might want to retain. Conceivably, therefore, 
Kenya might want to negotiate for transit terms attractive to the land-
locked states, including "free zones" or inland container terminal, 
possibly at Eldoret where the requisite customs facilities, in any, 
could be operated. Th may alro help alleviate the congestion 
at Mombasa port and hasten transit. It seems though, that the "free 
zones" would be more easily arranged for the expanded Tanga port than 
at Mombasa or Dar es Salaam. 
Whatever is the transit option finally chosen and for any 
specific consignment, the KBO states are seeking alternative routes to 
reduce their vulnerability to political or economic hindrances to their 
external trade. The Government of Austria and Italy have actually 
undertaken to conduct the feasibility studies for the three alterna-
tive routes and their reports, possibly submitted to KBO in 1985. 
Thfe telecommunications links was examined by a special 
committee, six experts from the four KBO states, constituted on July 7, 
1982 and reported their recommendations to the
1
 13th Meeting of the 
KBO Commission the same week.
 1 
They examined two modalities: Temporary High Frequency Links 
and The Long Term Microwave Links. In the course of time, there was 
already a Standard B Earth Satellite station installed at Kigali for 
the improvement of telecommunications. It remained for the Commission 
to seek funds for installation of both modalities. 
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3. Industries 
Industrial development projects envisaged by the KDO have been 
mentioned in several contexts in the preceding pages. In fact, such 
projects should figure prominently within the programme of KBO simply 
to get an effective link with the energy programmes and to make the 
hydropower projects viable. So far, the clearest consumer of the 
energy is irrigation where the hydroelectric power would be used for 
pumping purpose. It is clear, however, that most of the irrigation 
work will have long gestation period as the programme endeavours to 
train the farmers in the irrigation culture, to develop an effective 
extension service and to acquire the requisite agricultural inputs 
to make the farming profitable. 
It seems, therefore, that for most of the formative years the 
irrigation programme would need subsidies. Consequently, its capacity 
to support the repayment of the loans for the construction, production 
and distribution of the power would be minimal, if not non-existent. 
In the absence of industries as the consumers of electricity, 
the only consumer would be domestic and municipal entities whose 
financial contribution would evidently be inadequate for the effective 
repayment of the cost of the power. 
I 
For these reasons it seems imperative that the KBO programmes 
should ensure that bankable industrial projects are identified and 
developed to operational stage by the time the hydropower production 
commences. 
72 
The Final Report of the multi-disciplinary-multi-donor mission 
was able to identify only six bankable projects, namely: manufacture 
72. This information is obtained from Final Report - Volume 5 
Industries, Health and Environment, op.cit. pp. 26-35 
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of fuel peat products; use of bagasse for pulp and paper; molasses 
food product processing; malt and its uses; milling of corn and 
wheat; and Remie Fibre production. 
Peat is found in minable quantities in both Burundi and Rwanda, 
its importance is in its versatility as a source of energy, chemicals 
and fertilizer, as well as in the production of nickel. Thus, it is 
viewed by KBO as a possible cornerstone of industrialization in the 
region. 
Further and detailed studies needed to be done on the precise 
location, quantity, quality as well as precise and ideal use patterns 
including possibility for substitution for other forms of energy. The 
KBO's final reports posited, for instance that peat could be sub-
stituted for fuel oils in cement plants. 
In Bujumbura a USAID Project has experimented with small scale 
use of peat from inland sedge bogs for making briquettes for domestic 
use. Similarly at Kigali a UNDP Project has supported the extraction of 
papyrus peat from swamps. Both efforts could be nucli for a major 
collaborative industrial efforts in the basin. 
Bagasse has been used as a source of fuel by the Kagera Sugar 
Company discussed above, and that possibility might continue on limited 
scale as hydropower production expands. Later, it is envisaged that 
the bagasse can be used in a paper and pulp industry leading to 
juxtaposition of sugar plants to paper and pulp mills. This is a 
project to keep in mind particularly in the existing sugar growing 
region in Kyaka Kakono area. 
The processing of molasses food products is associated with 
the sugar industry where the initial stage would be desugarization of 
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molasses to recover sucrose in crystal form. Thereafter there are 
possibilities for production of animal feeds and alcohol. 
Barley and raw malt as well as corn are needed to keep up the 
production of beer in the region. Existing and future breweries have 
been estimated to need a total of 4,000 tons of malt per year. 
Besides, there will be possibilities of export which can be exploited 
by local industries. 
Industrial scale milling of corn and wheat has also been con-
sidered, specifically for breweries. It is estimated that the present 
needs are 1,000 tonnes per year, and an additional 2,660 tonnes per year 
with some future expansion. For these purposes cornhouses with 
production capacity of 4,00 to 5,000 tonnes per year is necessary. 
The reports say, though, that corn houses are profitable for a minimum 
production of 15,000 tonnes per year, which automatically urges the 
basin states to consider the higher brewery-capacities, so that the 
grits can be shared among the basin states. 
Remie fibre, similar to cotton, has been considered for a project 
entailing an agricultural holding of 650 hectares. The fibre would be 
fed into a textile plant at Kigali to produce woven materials. 
Two other possible industrial projects considered only preli-
minarily by KBO are Cement and Methane gas. The methane gas deposits 
whose deposits are under Lake Kivu, seem to have enjoyed more studies 
since 1930, but there still are no complete feasibility studies to 
determine large scale exploitation and utilization. 
Fertilizer production possibilities was a rather prominent 
item in the background studies with the clear indications that it may 
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carry the key to any success in agricultural sector. Yet the Final 
Report did not list it among the possible projects under KBO's 
industrialization programme. 
The indicative Basin Plan was much clearer on this point than 
is the Final Plan of the multi-disciplinary-multi-donor mission. In 
the Indicative Basin Plan it was stated categorically that the hydro-
' • ' ' Li.'. 
energy projects of Rusumo, Kishanda and Kakono were to be significantly 
used for the production of fertilizers. Out of 206MW potential 130MW 
73 
would go to fertilizer production. That is a substantial portion of 
the power as envisaged and even though some variations would be ex-
pected from the final mission report it is rather curious that the 
difference could be so significant that fertilizer project is dropped 
altogether from the list of bankable industrial projects. 
At least, it seems that the Indicative Basin Plan had given 
' J; i 
some statistical consideration to fertilizer production. It said: 
"350,00 metric tons of calcium nitrate will be obtained 
from limestone (deposits of which remain to be identified). 
100,000 metric tons of phosphates, and 15,000 metric tons 
of potash would be imported from Zaire or Uganda for a 
total production of 490,000 metric tons of fertilizer 
which will meet the requirements for the year 2000". 
The report added that the technology recommended for the production 
of amoniac is based on electrolysis of water for the production of 
hydrogen and this alone would consume 90 percent of the 130MW referred 
to above. They.conclude that fertilizer so produced would cost 
73. For these summary data from the Indicative Basin Plan, see 
KBO General Background, 1979. op.cit. p. 29. 
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approximately US $S5 per ton as against the imported fertilizer which 
would cost US $160 per ton. 
It is important that both the agricultural projects and the 
hydro-power plans depended on the above combination. In fact, there was 
« V;' ' ' 
pressure that the Belgian Government should finance the Rusumo dam 
immediately with the above projects in mind. 
Clearly, there is a weakness in the pace of planning for. 
industrial 
projects under KBO and it desrves restatement that without 
industrial use of the power to pay for the cost of construction and 
production, the hydro-power plan might be in serious jeopardy as might 
also the agricultural sector. .• ••:: i, : . • • • •• • •.. , 
• (.) : 1. • ;. 
4. Training and Manpower Development 
Trained manpower is the human resource in the economic sense in 
that such people can contribute to the development work in their re-
spective fields. In ultimate analysis trained manpower is a prerequisite 
as well as one of the indicators of development. Discussions with top 
officials of KBO characterized manpower shortage as one of the most 
critical bottlenecks to the development efforts in the basin states. 
Therefore, it was made one of the top priorities of the Commission. 
In recognition of this serious weakness KBO initiated, nego-
tiations with possible financial support for training opportunities 
abroad, to meet their manpower needs. Concurrently, the prepared 
"Procedure for Selection of Candidates for Training and Conditions 
for the Award of KBO Scholarship", formally adopted by the Commission 
at its thirteenth session in July 1982. 
According to these guidelines, the training.opportunities of 
KBO would be worked out according to the organization's development work 
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and programme, and priority to be extended to those already in its 
service, and they must be citizens of the member states. 
Whatever training opportunities are available notification 
is sent to the member states who are requested to nominate qualified 
candidates. But the ultimate decision for those receiving the 
opportunities is -made by the Executive Secretary and the Directors. 
All the recipients of the scholarships are bonded to serve the 
KBO for two years, or for a duration twice the training period, which-
ever is longer. For its part, KBO is to pay the benefits of the 
recipient, including the arrangement for travel expenses. 
One set of scholarships had been obtained from USAID for four 
muster's degree level studies In the United States. The agricultural 
economist's and the civil engineer (construction) positions went to 
Tanzanians while the industrial engineer was from Rwanda and a hydraulic 
engineer was from Burundi. Of these four the agricultural economist 
had completed studies by the end of 1982. A second set of scholarships 
from USAID was to include an electrical engineer, a civil engineer 
(structures) an electrical engineer and one in administration and 
management. And the Commission was busily exploring opportunities for 
more scholarships. 
5. Uganda Projects 
It will be recalled that the instrument accepting accession 
of Uganda to the KBO Agreement was adopted by the contracting states 
on 19 Hay 1981 and entered into force on 16 October 1981. Therefore, 
the possibility of Uganda projects did not evolve with those of the 
other KBO states. In fact, it was at its 12th Session in 1982 of the 
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Commission that Uganda actually requested that projects within its 




territory be considered for studies and evaluation* But only txans-
• .,1 . ». i: I : , •• • ' . ' 
portation in Uganda was considered at that session. 
Thus, for the first time a formal list of possible Uganda 
projects was presented to the 13th Session of the Commission in July 
1983, as agenda item number thirteen. They had not been evaluated by 
the time of this survey. Therefore, they are listed here only for 
indication of the range. The ten projects are: Nyabugongi Rice Scheme; 
tsetse fly and Trypanosomiasis eradication; small hydropower schemes in 
southwest Uganda; livestock improvement; afforestation in Ruhuma area; 
reclamation of Mulindi Swamp; mineral exploration in Kabale region; 
fisheries project in Lakes Mburo, Kakyora and Kijanibarora; saw milling 
in Muko planted forest and Kajiru forest; and improved rainfed agri-
culture in Rakai District. The Uganda Commissioner informed the session 
• l . i. ;; . . 
that Uganda experts had commenced formulation of four of the projects, 
namely, the Rice scheme, the Trapanosomiasis eradication project, 
afforestation, and rainfed agriculture. 
•' • ! Ij • • * '.. 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS AND REMEDIES 
River basin development programme, by its very nature, entails 
several environmental consequences most of which will have been 
suggested by the discussions of the development projects above. Some 
of the consequences are immediate, obvious and, at times sensational. 
These include inundation of land areas as well as displacement of 
population and wildlife by the reservoir created behind the dam. 
Othersare not so obvious, nor yet sensational; these include loss of 
lower fauna and flora, salinity of soil caused by irrigation, escalation 
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of the disease spread by water vectors, pollution caused by intensive 
use of fertilizers and pesticides, and adverse effect of the effluents 
from industries. 
This section will briefly outline the major environmental 
impacts that have been identified by the KBO in its Action Plan. 
Indications will thereafter be made of some of the possible impacts 
i 
not so clearly identified. Against these possible adverse effects 
we shall ascertain if the KBO programme of work had anticipated the 
impacts and what mitigating measures were included in the programme 
of work. 
Secondly, we shall discuss the extent to which the founding 
states had provided in their constituent instrument for amelioration 
of the adverse .environmental impacts. Finally, suggestions will be 
made for some possible additional legal and institutional machineries 
for the control of the adverse environmental impacts of river basin 
development programmes. 
At least the Action Plan prepared by the multi-disciplinary-
multi-donor mission took note of the concept of environmental problems 
74 
arising from the development projects. However, their concerns 
were confined to the effects of the Rusumo dam and Kagera weir the 
latter being behind Kishanda valley reservoir. So let us dispose 
of that discussion first before examining other possible problem 
areas which the KBO Action Plan seems to have ignored. 
74. Final Report - Volume 5 - Industries, Health and Environment, 
op.cit. pp. 95-109, is the full report on environment under 
the Action Plan. 
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The most dramatic and controversial environmental problem in 
the context of the KBO programmes was the impact of the reservoir 
of the Rusumo dam. As stated earlier, at various elevations it was 
to replace significant population from the adjoining Rwanda and 
t 
Burundi in the Nyabarongo]Valley. Recall that the original and highest 
• •' / t 
elevation of the dam was 1345 meters. It was attractive because it 
would also result in the highest hydropower production at Rusumo 
itself as well as at Kishanda and Kakono sites. This is clearly 
expressed in Table IV above. The elevation was therefore, easily 
preferable. 
On the other hand, the respective elevations of the dams were 
directly related to the land area which was submerged by the reservoir. 
TABLE XV - AREAS LIKELY TO BE SUBMERGED 
Vater 
level 
Total Surface area submerged (2) Usable surface area submerged 






















Corresponding to the areas of land to be submerged were"the 
numbers of people who would be displaced by the'reservoir and'for whom 
alternative settlement would have to be sought. These niimbers, for 
the three different levels of the dam are forcefully portrayed in 
Table XVI below. 
75. These figures came out clearly in the Tractionel-Electrobel 
Report done under contract with the Belgian Government for 
KBO States. See Hydropower Development of Rusumo falls: G -
Economic Summary and Conclusions June 1979 p.7. 
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TABLE XVI - INHABITANTS AFFECTED BY RUSUMO DAM AT VARIOUS LEVELS 
Water 
level 
Number of inhabitants affected 
Rwanda Burundi Total 
1345 22,975 2,975 25,950 
1335 10,445 1,610 12,055 
1325 2,220 535 2,755 
The Tractionel-Electrobel study had estimated in 1979 that 
at the population growth rate of 2.5 per cent and on assumption that 
the new generation would settle within the confines of the area to be 
submerged then in 1990 there would be 3,600 people displaced at level 
1325 meters and 34,000 people at level 1345. The intermediary ele-
vation would affect 17,500 people. 
With a negative environmental impact as anything that renders an 
area of land unihabitable or unusable the impact of the dam is obviously 
one. It was pointed out earlier that both Rwanda and Burundi are the 
most densely populated countries in Africa. Thus, simple loss of 
agricultural land, whaterver are the promises of gross national 
economic benefits, would generally be unacceptable. But when that is 
coupled with displacement of population for which new settlement 
are to be sought, then the matter might lead to a national crisis, 
depending on the degree as illustrated by the impact of the dam 
elevations. Rwanda and Burundi found it unacceptable to set the level 
of the dam at 1345 or 1335 meters. In fact, for these two countries, 
the highest elevation ff the dam was considered a "Tanzanian target" 
for the latter's own energy interest but, unacceptable for their "tiny 
Q O
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and overpopulated" countries.^ 
The resolution to this particular environmental problem of 
flooding was found in the adoption of the lowest elevation for the dam, 
1325 meters. Determined over the necessity for the construction of 
Rusumo falls power project, the Head of State of KBO member countries 
decided as such at a meeting on 9th May 1981. Henceforth, they 
77 
mutually agreed that the project should proceed. The point they made 
is that the problem and finding its resolution was not a zero-sum game: 
compromise to them was to reflect the net benefit. <• 
The reports also found that on the ichthyological perspective, 
the ecology downstream Rusumo Falls differed completely from the ecology 
upstream. Therefore, there would be no adverse consequences for the 
fish species. And other flow arrangements -could be made for the re-
plenishment of various planktons downstream. Ultimately, however, the 
reports suggested that further detailed studies of the impact were still 
necessary. 
Downstream the Rusumo Falls, site of the dam upto Kagera weir, 
the site of the Kishanda project had its own possible ecological si-
.;. i 
tuation not least of which is the impact on the Kagera National Park'. 
' , , , | 
The area is dotted with several lakes surrounded by thick papyrus 
swamps, natural channels and channels created by fishermen. '" The ecolo-
gist for the Final Report were not able to predict any specific adverse 
78 
effects on the ecology of the lakes and the papyrus swamps. On the 
76. Comments by the Rwanda Foreign Minister were reported in 
New Africa December, 1981. p.67. 
77. See the journalist's summary under "At Last: Kagera Go!" in 
ibid and in Final Report Volume 3 Energy op.cit. p. 57. 




other hand, they add in the same pages that the impact on Kagera 
National Park would o^ly slight, with the reservoir downstream the 
Rusumo dam, serving the purpose of seasonal water storage to be used 
during the dry season. 
On the other hand, they agreed that the Kagera weir, causing the 
reservoir in Kishanda valley to facilitate the funnel diversion, would 
strongly affect the water levels of Kagera National Park. The plan here 
is that a weir would be constructed below the point of Lake Rushwa. It 
would cause a reservoir, rising in level and diverted to fill Lake 
Rushwa and to create the massive Kishanda reservoir. The water sould 
then be taken through Bugera Tunnel where it would have a sufficient 
head as it "falls" in the natural course of Kagera River. Here is the 
Kishanda hydropower project (before Kakono) discussed earlier. (See 
the Schematic diagram below. 
/ 
It is predicted that the weir will operate at levels between 
1282 and 1284 meters. Although the studies predict that the highest 
level will rarely be attained it is still apparent that the water 
level in the National Park will be high enough to warrant further impact 
studies, because there would be impacts on the wildlife as well as the 
papyrus swamps. 
The final point to observe on the weir is that downstream "the 
river will be virtually dry for most of the dry season and the effect 
79 
on the present narrow fringe of swamp vegetation will be drastic." 
In any event, the drying up of the river will obviously destroy the 
habitat for various bird, animal and plant life. 
79. ibid p. 108. 
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In all these cases the Final Report makes no suggestion whatso-
ever for ways of ameliorating the adverse effects. It is simply submitted 
that the animals will probably migrate across the empty river to the 
Kishanda reservoir. 
On the general questions of public health the only subject that 
seemed to concern the final report was tsetse and trypanosomiasis 
80 
eradication for the protection of human beings and livestock. This, 
of course, is an exercise to improve the environment and increase its 
'j ... 
habitability rather than eradicating a problem created by the basin 
I . . 
development projects. It was to be handled as a regional problem 
only for reasons of effectiveness. 
In general, however, the KBO had taken the position that even 
though irrigation would lead to several vectorborne diseases, the 
task of the control of the disease rested with the member states. 81 
For its part KBO could play a role in the standardization and harmoni-
zation of health practices as well as exchange of information. It was 
i .' _ 
hoped too that the donor agencies would take public health matters 
into account in the project fromulation so that the problems be dealt 
with generically. • ' ; ? . . . 
80. For the outline of the project, see ibid pp. 46-93. 
81. Observation in the Report by Professor Takateru Ohse, 
MD. Environmental Health Consultant from UNECA. May 1980 to 
KBO, page 2. 
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Health and the general environmental problems which might be 
associated with industries do not seem to have received any attention. 
Clearly, the formulation of projects on industrialization seem to be 
unfortunately weak in that although a few bankable projects were preli-
minarily identified there are no solid formulation of industrial prog-
rammes. Concommitantly, those concerned with formulation of the 
environmental policies did not anticipate adverse consequences of any 
intensified industrialization in the basin in order to formulate general 
policies. 
There are no policies regarding national or transnational 
effects of air pollution from industries. And there are no policies 
expressed on the disposal of wastes into the waterways particularly the 
river Kagera itself. Discharge of wastes into the waters could conceivably 
have deleterious consequences within the offending state or in the lower 
riparian, both in terms of contamination of drinking water or fishery 
resources. 
Pollution of the Kagera river can have far reaching implications; 
the river finally empties its load into Lake Victoria which is drained 
by the Nile. Obviously it would take a great deal of pollution of the 
Kagera to defy autobiodegradation in the river itself and in Lake 
Victoria to reach the Nile, but that position is valid, in the long run, 
only if the discharge of wastes into the river is kept under control. 
In the long-run one has to recall that River Cuyahoga, a tributary of 
Mississippi caught fire due to its inflamable load of pollutants, or that 
Lake Erie turned into a cesspool due to pollutants reaching it within the 
same century. Probably, the latter situation would never have arisen if 
the pollution control standards called for by the International Joint 
Commission (between USA and Canada) in 1918 were heeded. 
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In the present case the absence of the policy suggestions on 
these environmental problems, in the Final Report seem to be a major defect. 
But it is also patently anomalous In an actual action plan of an organization 
whose list of functions include environmental protection. The problems will 
I 
be immediate once the construction stage of the KBO is commenced. 
Rather than these immediate problems, the KBO concerned itself 
with a long term goal of establishing an Environment Advisory.Centre (EAC). 
The Centre was proposed by two consultants: Michel Maldague from University 
of Laval and Alan Rodgers of University of Dar es Salaam, funded by Swedish 
International Development Agency (SIDA) and executed by IUCN'a Conservation 
for Development Centre. The consultants' report was submitted in August 
1982. 
The goal of. the consultancy was described in general terms, as 
being "...to verify the feasibility of the creation within the Kagera Basin 
Organization of the Centre whose main objective would be to ensure that the 
natural resources of the Kagera River Basin would be used in an optimal way 
taking into account the needs of the population, the necessity for the 
countries to develop, and the obligation to safeguard the ecological 
Equilibrium" (emphasis added). One only needs to observe in passing that 
once the wide range of development activities was introduced
s
 the goal 
should have been of sustainable utilization rather than ecological equili-
brium. 
There must be a place where the call for and the feasibility 
of the creation of the Centre was proposed, possibly within the KBO, in 
•i • 
order to justify the verification of the feasibility. That could have 
been in a terms of reference, Issued by the KBO, if there was. On the 
other hand, the obligations to be safeguarded, must have been assumed 
. • ir i :. : » • M' " ' ' ' 
because as will be clear below, obligations of the member states on 
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ecological equilibrium had not been articulated in the Rusumo agreement, 
nor yet was there any special protocol providing tire same. 
The Centre was to have six broadly defined functions, summarized 
as follows: (a), coordination to avoid duplication of efforts in environ-
mental matters, among disciplines, university research centres, and 
projects sponsored by international agencies; (b). data collection and 
organization for use by the KBO member states as well as KBO itself, 
and to provide data - base for existing environmental conditions; (c). 
monitoring - to get information concerning effects of disposal of new sub-
bstances in the environment; to perform environmental impact assessment of 
pending projects; and to conduct aerial photography as part of data 
collection. (u). to conduct research into various ecological.problems, 
liaise with scientists in the region and to advise policy makers; (e) to 
conduct training and to build manpower for implementation of environmental 
goals; (f) to provide general advisory services to KBO on environment and 
development. 
The consultants outlined the staff needs, as indications of the 
institutional framework on the environmental question. At the top of the 
Centre, to be based at KBO headquarters are two Expatriates with two 
counterparts, consultants for 24 man-months over five years, and three 
professionals one at each of the regional offices in Burundi, Tanzania and 
Uganda. 
Technical staff are to be recruited for aerial photo technician, 
reproduction, cartographer, data processors, agriculturalist, and computer 
assistant. The support staff are to be six in all. 
i' 
For accommodation there would be three large and two small 
offices with six technical laboratory. 
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To assist in the technical direction of the Centre, there 
would be established an Advisory Panel. 
The idea of the Environmental Advisory Centre may be a splendid 
move to strengthen institutional framework on environmental matters in 
KBO's development programmes. However, it seemed hardly an immediate 
issue for KBO. Projects were already planned and some of the impacts anti-
cipated have been enumerated above. In most cases, the final report had 
called for yet further studies to determine the precise scope of adverse 
effects and the possible remedial measures. A properly balanced priority 
order within IUCN should have rushed to support the detailed studies rather 
than establishment of the Centre. 
And even if the Centre was to be a priority matter the .proposal 
sets for two expatriates perched at the top of i_ without a clear demon-
stration that there were no ecologists and engineers within the member states, 
who could be deployed to make the assessments. It is conceivable that for 
the technical functions, University staff could be deployed on secondment 
or part-time basis to assist the KBO's work. This approach might in fact 
work as a mode of establishment and building of local manpower and institu-
tional capabilities. The provisions for foreign experts arid consultants in 
the proposal seems suspiciously large. But then the consultants also sugge-
sted the creation of an Advisory Panel and recommended themselves by name, 
to become its members. 
In the end the personal emoluments for the expatriates was to 
amount to US $840,000 as against only $550,000 for the local staff, over 
five year duration. And KBO member states would have to find the money 
alongside with the resources for development work and for the serious 
environmental impact assessment for the immediate development projects. 
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Thus viewed, the idea of Environmental Advisory
1
 Centre was difficult to 
view as a serious and immediate project for the KBO states. 
What seem9 evident is that the environmental impact of the 
first generation of development projects of KBO were not given adequate 
and serious treatment by the member states and their consultants. The 
treatment in the multi-disciplinary-multi-donor mission reports were 
cursory and only pointed out the need for further and detailed studies. 
There are very scanty traces of explicit statement of remedial measures 
designed to mitigate any explicit negative impacts. 
Environmental Issues and the Constituent Inst rumen t: 
The only explicit expression of concern with environmental 
matters in the Rusumo Agreement was the enlistment among the objectives 
of KBO that it would deal, inter alia, with "Environment protection". 
Obviously, this simple expression of the objective does not constitute an 
obligation on the part of the member states to prevent, control or miti-
gate any possible environmental injuries. Thus, there simply are no 
expressions of normative standards or procedures for regulation of posible 
direct or indirect negative environmental consequences of construction, 
industrial or agricultural work in the basin as discussed. It is not 
possible to establish that this discrepancy in the constituent instrument 
led to the laxity in the planners to endure serious and definitive miti-
gating measures to the adverse environmental impacts of the development 
programmes. But there is a curious coincidence between this and the lack of clear 
concern by the member states that the mitigating measures should be estab-
lished before the development projects, such as the Rusumo dam, are 
commenced. There is no clear package of legal obligation to prevent 
environmental damage. Similarly, there is no expression of policy under-




Expression of such policies may lead to action in the interest 
of the environment but the provision of legal obligation in the consituent 
agreement, properly ratified by the basin states requires the states to 
adhere to the general technical standards and the specific normative 
regulations adopted from time to time according to the perceived needs. 
For these reasons, one may suggest in summary form, the following 
additional principles which could have gone into the original agreement, 
or to be adopted in a special protocol on environmental protection. 
(a) A provision should have been adopted stating explicitly that 
one of the purposes of the KBO is to ensure rational and integrated basin-
wide development to Ir.ply sustained utilization of natural resources, 
prevention of environmental injuries, the protection of native fauna and 
flora, and the protection of public health. 
(b) The constituent instrument should provide that in all common or 
individual state works the each developer Is under obligation to ensure that 
the activities donot cause adverse environmental effects within the project 
area. Secondly, that effluents from such projects must not cause specific 
• 1 
or general environmental injuries in any other area beyond the jurisdication 
of the member states. 
(c) There should have been an obligation to the effect that in all 
projects conducted within the plans of the KBO, the organization and the 
J . ' 1 ' 
individual states within whose state the project is done shall ensure the 
protection of health and well-being of individuals resident in the con-
tracting states. 
(d) There should be provision of administrative and judicial 
remedies in each basin state, for individuals or groups who are victims of 
environmental injuries arising from KBO projects. 
- 92 - I D S / D P 284 
A precusor convention with provisions along these lines is the 
Nordic Environmental Protection Convention, signed at Stockholm on 19th 
February 1974 by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Article 3 is quoted 
82 
here in extenso: 
"Any person who is affected or may be affected by a 
nuisance caused by environmentally harmful activities 
in another Contracting Scate shall have the right to bring 
before the appropriate Court or Administrative Authority 
of that state the question of permissibility of such 
activities, including the question of measures to prevent 
damage, and to appeal against the decision of the Court or 
Administrative Authority to the sime extent and on the. 
came terms., as. a legal entity of the St,ate in which the 
activities are being carried cut. 
The provisions of the first paragraph of this 
Article shall be equally applicable in the case of pro-
ceedings concerning compensation for damage caused by 
environmentally harmful activities. The question of 
compensation shall net be judged by the rules that are 
less favourable to the injured party than the rules of 
compensation of the State in which the activities are 
bting carried out." 
The Nordic provision relates to trans-territorial environmental 
injuries and, implicitly it assumes th.it there will be legal provisions for 
redress ot environmental injuries caused within each contracting state. 
Indeed, most countries in Africa, including the basin state may not have de-
veloped full legislation for redress of such injuries at national 
82. The Convention- is repreinted in 13 International 1- ~1 No.3 Materials 
pp. 591-596 (1974). 
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level. Then perhaps Che increasing agricultural and industrial expansion 
within Che basin should prompt such iniciatives. Granted, the Nordic 
countries have long history of collaboration which explains their accep-
tance of the elaborate conditions. But there is no excuse for the African 
states under discussion failing to make bold attempts in the protection of 
their natural resources and public health. After all, development depends 
on these factors. 
(e) The machinery for the settlement of disputes in Article 18 of 
the Agreement, which calls for consultations among the parties, failing 
which the parties should resort to the procedures set out in the Charter 
of the OAU is rather too general and imprecise for the complex issues of 
management of international water resources. It will be recalled that the 
Charter of the OAU was drawn up with a focus on the political and security 
problems of the 1950's and 1960s in mind. As.such the emphasis was on 
mediation and conciliation by other member states. The management of 
natural resources under consideration in the KBO's work entail technical 
issues such as equitable sharing and utilization, regulation and control of 
pollution. Admittedly, the general OAU procedures might be applied mutatis 
mutandis with participation of technical "masters". 0" the other hand, it 
is more straight forward to sketch out procedure directly suited to the 
problems. 
It is suggested here, for instance, that where preliminary con-
' . . ' . . • • • .">.' .j . "• <. 
sulfations fail, the dispute should be referred to a selected panel of 
experts composed of persons with established experience in integrated 
management of drainage basins. The panel could then review the facts-in-
issue then to give the parties a fixed duration during which an investi-
gative mediation may be conducted towards a consensual resolution. There 
is no magic figure for the duration but it must i.ot be too long: environ-
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mental problems associated with drainage basin management are often such 
that if their resolution is delayed then some irreversible consequences 
might ensure. Moreover, the investiments and construction work which be 
might be involved, such as dam construction, are so expensive that once 
established they are not easily modified. Therefore, a maximum duration of 
two years is suggested here. 
If a review by the expert panel after the two years does not 
yield a resolution then the dispute is to be referred .to an arbitral or 
judicial machinery whose procedure entail a binding decision. The implicit 
suggestion is that; the existance of a decisional procedure will actually 
induce the states involved to make the consensual procedure effective** . 
states often prefer the latter to 'an arbitral or judicial procedures 
It is suggested here that these aspects of the machinery for 
settlement of dispute should have been set out the agreement for the 
management and development of the drainage basin. The basin states are, 
at that stage, able to review the machinery as part of the package with 
their anticipated socio-economic benefits and not as isolated intervention 
or interference with the development of programmes. As it is these 
suggestions could in some cases be adopted as amendments; they may also be 
adopted in a special protocol to the Agreement. 
(f) An additional policy initiative for environmental monitoring and 
protection is available at regional level, covering the entire catchment 
area of Lake Victoria. The approach was recommended at the end of the 
i
 1
 • ' *
 1
 : 
"Workshop on the Quality of Water Input into Lake Victoria," which was 
held at Tom Mboya Labour College, Kisumu from July 25 to August 7, 1982 
under the aegis of Kenya's Laki Basin Development Authority (LBDA). It 
. », J F J 
was attended by senori experts from Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and an Ecologist 
representing Kagera Basin Organization. At the end, the Workshop adopted 
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several procedural and substantive recommendations one of which requested 
the Managing Director of LBDA to assume the coordinating role and to convene 
s u b s e q u e n t regional meetings to work, out strategies f^r the exchange of 
information, standardization of data and collaboration in the control 
t ' 
water quality particularly for the protection of public health and the con-
servation of living resources of the entire aquatic area. That line of 
action is particularly opportune, in view of the end c>f data collection 
phase of the Hydrometeorological Survey. It should be possible for the 
countries to work out a development oriented action plan, funded by UNDP as 
a follow up to the hydrometecrological Survey. In fact, the LBDA has 
powers under Section 8(m) of its Act, to perform such functions. 
VI FINANCI/iL RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS OF KBO PROJECTS 
This Chapter of the paper is concerned with three broad questions. 
First, how much money is required for the execution of the projects outlined 
above. Secondly, what are the sources organized for raising the funds. 
Thirdly, we shali outline a few logistical questions related to the financial 
resources and how they are to be obtained. 
(a) The Financial Requirements. 
On the sum of money required for the projects, the purpose here 
is only to bring out the precise magnitude, in global terms. Table XVII 
83 below gives a summary of the costs, from studies to the projects. 
Obtained from Development Programme of the Kap.era Basin; Final Report 
- Executive Summary (Kigali, Kagera Basin Organization February 1982) 
p. 73. 
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TABLE XVII - SUMMARY OF COSTS OF KBO PROGRAMMES 
STUDIES 




seconda y 12,979,200 
Industries 180,000 









construction of network 






Sub total for projects: 











On the other hand, we are aware that the KBO has not adopted 
a formal framework for common projects/works as did the organization for 
the Management of the Senegal Basin (OhVS) by the Convention on Legal 
Status of common Works, adopted on December 12,1978. Later, the OMVS 
member states adopted onCDBcembicnldn the Financial Arrangements for the 
Common Works on may 12,1982. In the case of the KBO, the projects are 
essentially national, with the organization having done the overall basin-
wide planning presumably, to ensure a basin-wide coherence as well as to 
take account of the unity of the basin as an ecosystem. Besides, the KBO 
as an organization, may coordinate the fund-raising operations to take 
care of the collectively agreed priority projects. 
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Otherwise nose of the projects, particularly in agriculture, 
will be implemented as national projects, albeit, with the regional 
implications for food security. For these reasons the costs for the imple-
mentation of the agricultural sector projects should be isolated and 
identified individually, but unlike the agicultural sector, the all the 
three hydropower projects have regional implication, each with structures 
affecting more than one state. In fact, the respective member states may 
easily decide to go it alone on fund-raising for agricultural projects, 
rainfed or irrigated once the respective costs are identified; unless there 
is a specific and novel advantage in going together. For these reasons, 
Table XVIII, which is a disaggregation of Table XVII gives a picture of 
the costs of various projects of K B O . ^ Thus, while the total cost of the 
programmes is just over US$3 billion, if agricultural projects under the • 
programme were handled by the individual and respective territorial states, 
then a significant requiring very high level of accountability, will have 
been taken up at its basic place, even if the financial relief, for KBO 
as an organization, is not overwhelming, Nevertheless, the amount of US 
$74,561,000 estimated for the agricultural sector is a significant amount. 
The fact that the KBO's hydropower projects could be phased out 
over a long period of time is underscared by the fact that the estimated 
total amount for the energy sector extends beyond the three top priority 
V 
projects, namely, x\usumo, Kishanda and Kakono. In fact, the estimate for 
energy covers some eight project sites, and includes studies,' construction 
I.' 
8 4
 KB0> Final Report; Executive Summary op. cit. pp. 72-73 
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and the transmission linos. Therefore, to understand the estimated costs 
I 
for the three top priority projects Table XIX offers an outline of the eight 
projects, the estimated costs and the scheduled t i m e . ^ 


















Rusumo Falls 80 
P 
270 130 
» . | 
1984 • .-i 
Kakono 53 126 65 1989 
| Gitega 25 117 54 1990 
Kishanda 207 500 181 1992 
Nyabarongo • 12.6 88,3 24.3 1996 , i 
Mumwendo 30 157 83.5 1997 
Rukarara 6.4 23.5 10 . 1998.. j 
Murongwe 11 47.3 24.4 1999 j 
. i. J 
• 
'. TOTAL $25 29.1 572.2 
1 
.. 
Note that the cost shown in Table XIX is only that of construction 
of the dams but excludes stuuies and the transmission lines, as shown on 
line 4 of Table XVIII. But what is also clear irom the table is that some 
of the project sites offer an option for exclusively national funding, cons-
truction and distribution until some kind of regional grid is worked out. 
Examples under that category are Gitega in Burundi, Mumwendo in Tanzania and 
Nyabarongo in Rwanda. There is a general appearance that the Murongwe site 
may be physically related to the Kishanda and Kakono sites and therefore 
requiring a multi-state planning and construction. But the Bukarara-Gikongoro 
site like the Nyabarongo one, are Rwandese affairs. 
ibid p.49 It is to be noted that the years of "production" shown in. 
the Tables would remain hypothetical if funds were not available to 
start site development. 
> 
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Once more the implication here is that the KBO member states 
have the option to develop the resources and seek a modality for common 
financial responsibility for the projects, or to relegate some to all-
out national efforts. 
Precisely these options are already available in the railways 
and roads programme. Both of these infrastructure, it will be recalled, 
are package so as to disenclave the Kagera basin. Therefore, they are 
useful if the reticulation cover the region and retain the interstate 
character. At the same time, it is imperative that whoever is the 
funding source for the railways or roads sections of the road within 
each state have both, the national and international characters. It is 
therefore conceivable that a "puzzle approach" can be taken for the 
railways and roads where by the vital intra- and inter-state sections 
are done at a time as funds become available. Table XX outlines the 
86 
various pieces of the "puzzle" and the financial implications. 
Table XX illustrates a segmentation which could be applied 
to railways as for roads. And while financial resources may be nego-
tiated collectively, accountability for satisfactory completion could 
remain for the respective territorial state for each segment. 
86. ibid p. 59. 
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TABLE XX - SUMMARY OF COSTS OF STANDARD CONSTRUCTION, GRADING, DRAINAGE, 
STATIONS, SHEDS, LOOPS. 
i 










 US $ 
I 
Uninza-Bigina (Burundi Border) 
i 
122 j 51,782 
' ' 1 
424 x
 1 
Bigina-Musongati 60 i 30,515 508 
Musongati-Gitega 42 25,897 617 
Gitegi-riuyon we 85 90,779 1,068 
(Buyongwe-Tanzania Border) (108) (126,329) (1,170) 
Gitega-Tanzania Border 74 71,816 970 
Tanzania Border-Rusumo Falls 79 61,201 775 
Kemondo Bay-Rusumo Falls 224 219,180 978 
Kyaka Junction-Kyaka 50 lo,700 374 
Rusumo Falls-Kigali 228 295,661 11297 
Kigali-Ruhengeri 90 92,863 1,032 
Ruhengeri-Gisenyi 66 87,629 1,328 
Ruhengeri-Kabale 89 57,899 651 
Kabale-Ntungamo 75 74,392 992 
Ntungamo-Kabwohe 47 35,132 747 
Kabwohe-Bihanga 102 | 74,538 731 
TOTAL 
• 
1,433 1,287,984 899 
( ) Alternative (14C7) 
i 
(1,324,497) (903) 
(b) The Modes of Fund-Raising 
KBO has not established the elaborate arrangements for fundraising 
to finance common works as is in the case of OMVS. Instead they have adopted 
on formal and regular arrangement and one ad hoc arrangement. 
The formal and regular arrangement is in Article 15 of the Rusumo 
Agreement. As discussed earlier, the original requirement was that Tanzania 
was to contribute the largest share of the budget, 40 per cent; while Rwanda 
and Burundi were to contribute 35 and 25 per cent respectively. 
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But this formula changed after accession of Uganda. Henceforth, the first 
paragraph of the article was amended to read that, "The funds necessary 
for the functioning of the Secretariat, according to the annual budget 
as approved by the Commission, shall be contributed by the member States 
in equal proportions of 25% each. 
It is to be noted that the contribution here only went to the 
administrative and not project or operational budget. The Agreement is 
totally silent on the question of financing projects. This practice may 
have left open the question of optional modalities for raising funds for 
projects on ad hoc basis. But it may also be a benign arrangment which 
could encourage lack of seriousness on project funding. The danger is 
that if projects donot pick up quickly the very administrative may, in 
the face of tax-payers and member governments, lose justification for its 
C A l u ' C U t i ^ w • I**. l u v* « -j-'a r'•!-»-{ f n v n ^ > o r v v j i i n r l - ? f n r f l o f 
tax-payers' funds to service an administrative machinery when the latter 
does not seem to be engaged on any productive projects. Contracting states 
should seem to have entered into formal obligations to raise in form of 
loans or grants for projects to engage the administrative machinery opera-
tionally. This is why it is important to ponder the contractual arrange-
ments of the OKVS for iinancing common projects; a modified version of 
such an arrangement could be applied to the KBO situation where there are 
still no formally designated common works. 
The second approach which has been taken by KBO is the use of 
Donor Conferences. The arrangement has history in the experience of 
Zimbabwe at the time of its independence and in Southern African Develop-
ment Coordination Committee (SADCC). In both cases, some success in fund-
raising have been made. But it is also important to remember that the 
Zimbabwean independence was an emotional and highly politicized and visible 
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affair, as a result ot the events which l.^ d to it. And it took the acutely 
e x p e r i e n c e d had of BenarJ Chidzero, the Finance Minister who also had 
enormous contact and skill in mobilizing the existing sentiments to yield 
money. Somewhat similarly, the situation in SADCC relied on the sentiments 
towards South Africa in whose strangle-hold the SADCC countries were held. 
In fact, the foundations of SADCC seemed to lay in Brussels, the home of 
EEC, from which most of the support for SADCC came. 
These situations are drastically diferent from those which 
obtained at KBO. Therefore, from the outset, KBO was opting for the concept 
from a "disadvantaged" position. , . ... 
AS pointed out earlier, KBO experienced with its first Donor 
Conference in Paris in October 1979. The assembled donors resolved 
politely that the main features of the priority subjects had been identi-
fied but that further preinvestment studies should be conducted before 
investment funding could be considered. In short, the preparation of the 
projects was inadequate. 
i 
The second Donor Conference for KhO was once more organized 
by the UNDP Regional Director for Africa, and held at Geneva on 20th and 
21st May 1982. Before the Conference was presented the six volume Final 
Reports of the multi-disciplinary-multi-donor mission discussed in the 
projects chapter above, and in which, it will be recalled, the cost of 
various project sectors were given. But rather than concotnmitment to 
amounts, the delegates attending the Conference simply, declared the general 
subject areas of their interest. The following list outlines the countries 
or organizations and the corresponding fields of their interest. 
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Field of interest 
Railway transport, small hydropower schemes, 
afforestation, tse-tse fly control, malaria 
control, training 
Energy projects (Rusumo) 
Agriculture 
Training 
Energy projects, Rural works 
(Irrigation in Rwanda) 
Institutional and Technical Assistance 
(supply of experts and technicians) 
in River Basin development 
Transportation and Energy development 
Transport and Agriculture (Rwanda) 
* • 
Railway Transport, Hydropower, 
Agriculture, Training 
Industrial projects (Paper manufacture 
from Baggasse, Industrial alcohol from 
Molasses, Malt, Afforestation, Panel 
manufacture 
Irrigation and Drainage Projects 
Agriculture, Rural Development (Tanzania) 
Irrigation and Drainage Projects 
Afforest ition, Energy (Tanzania) 
Resources and Environment Assesment, 
Energy, Agricultural Research & 
Irrigation (Rwanda) Training Fellowships 
Agriculture, Transport 
Ordinarily, it would have been expected that if seriously meant, 
the indications of interest would have been done in the respective amounts. 
As it is the indications were only general: In the discussions with the 
representatives of these donor agencies in Kigali, they were unanimous 
that the expressions of interests did not amount to commitment. They still 
expected that serious discussions would follow, on bilateral basis, for the 
precise aommitments. And at Geneva, a number or countries already indicated 




The KBO Commission it sell was of the view that the Geneva 
Donor Conference w,s less than a success. At the 13tli Commission Session 
87 
at Kigali in July 1982, they assessed the Conference and they summari-
zed the weaknesses in some specific respects: (a) the preparation for the 
Conference was inadequate; (b) the Commission, the Secretariat and UNDP 
were not working as a coordinated team and this led to occnlonal 
embarassing misunderstandings; (c) members OL KBO had not all agreed on 
the prioritization of projects; (d) while it had been assumed that the 
KBO Commission Chairman would preside over the Conference and UNDP to act 
as the animator at the- meeting UNDP wanted to preside over the Conference, 
with awkward results; (e) the role of UNDP became confusing as they 
critized the prioritization of projects. This should have been sorted out 
before the Conference. 
In the end. the Commission was convinced that the two concrete 
outcomes of the Conference were the commitment for the Rusumo dam project 
jy Belgium and the railways Study by Austria and Italy. 
Two of the decisions adopted by that Commission, of a consequence 
of the Geneva, were that they should have clotes consultation with UNDP on 
the prioritization of the projects, and that KBO 3hould, henceforth, 
ccmm.mce rigorous direct and bilateral negotiations with interested donors. 
This iuejus that the Third Conference which was still anticipated would be 
a formal presentation of positions already declared in the bilateral 
discussions. 
87. Agenda item No. 5, 
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The foregiong point to the fact that Donor Conferences, as such, 
did not promise a great deal of financial resources to KBO programmes. 
Three billion dollars is not small money; compare it to the one billion 
which is needed for the OMVS projects and most of which was secured in form 
of loan, secured by the contracting states. 
(c) Observations on Logistics 
The limitations on the existing financial arrangements of KBO v/ill 
have been evident from tiie foregoing discussions. It will be suffiecient 
to directly suggest the following five possible approaches for raising the 
i i - • 
funds. 
First, although the KBO should retain a strict coordination role 
for the Commission, it should also allow a formal operation of ?:he "puzzle 
concept" so that within an agreed set of priorities the member states can 
proceed and bilaterally negotiate for funds from posiible donors. It seems 
from the preferences of donors, that some donors prefer the approach, as 
they name Kwand \ . nd Tanzania for some of the projects. The pieces of the 
puzzle which ar> taken up can then be ticked off on the drawing beard. 
Second, instead of presenting an amorphous list or volumes of 
projects as contained in the six volume presented at Geneva, the KBO 
Commission should agree on the priorities, then to prepare concise dossiers 
for each project. Very few of the people ; ttending the Donor Conference 
have either time or temperament for reading the full studies. In thi end 
the dossiers should be taken in a "shopping bag" to be presented to each 
prospective donor at suitable forum, not the politicized setting of a 
donor conference. As is well known various cionor institutions have their 
fields of interest in development which tney will prefer and the dossiers 
should reflect an understanding of the various philosophies. Thes*. dossiers 
should also t.'Ko into account the possible piecer of the puzzle. 
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Thirdly, with th. shopping bag in hand, the KBO and member states 
should organize contact sessions to sell the various dossiers- On the side 
of KBO is the Commission and the member states; on the side of the donors 
are the individual states and multilateral agencies such as EEC, IBRD or 
African Development Bank. Some cf the negotiations will be for grants and 
others for loans. 
If there is to be any donor conference then it must come much later 
than these informal contacts held in appropriate non-politicized atmosphere. 
The donor conference coming later should be more of a "show-room" where 
ready-made commitments are announced and where the donors, if they wish, can 
exchange views on their intended strategies for implementation. Otherwise.-, 
donor conferences c.s such could be an unnecessary expense r.nd a counter-
productive exercise. 
Fourth, if a conference is to take pi ice it must be properly 
recognized as an affair of the KBO, and not of UNDP or other sponsoring 
institutions. Tt ir- the recipient organization which might decide, after 
proper consultation, to delegate the chairmanship to an independent person. 
But thsre should be no misunderstanding »is to whose show it is. 
Firth, the arrangement for securing loans should be clearly 
adopted in an agreement or a protocol. As at the time of the Geneva Donor 
Conference the KbO States seemed set to look for grants. And some of the 
donors who were interested in the loan arrangements raised the question 
for which the answer was not ready. 
The loan guarantee arrangement would be straight-forward with 
the agricultural projects because they -ire essentially national. It woulu 
^lso be adaptable to the pieces of the puzzle which are national ao in the 
ro.ids and railway li^es. However, the formal arrangement is necessary 




Finally, a formal legal status should be arranged for the essen-
tially regional projects. Again there is a leaf to borrow from OMVS 
experience where Convention was adopteu on the legal status of regional 
projects, adopted on December 12,1978. 
Apart from the adoption of the concept of regional projects the 
projects should also be established as independent enterprises of the KBO 
so that their management are isolated for purposes of economic efficiency. 
They should be able to survive or sink alone, depending on the quality of 
their manav.ement. 
• , ...,','jj' • 
VII CONCLUSION 
The Kagera Basin Organization is one of the most recent efforts 
to plan and execute development in Africa through mobilization of r'.:soUrcer; 
determined by ecological unit of a basin. Very often development plans of 
that kind are influenced by the primacy of irrigated agriculture and the 
production of hydropower. In the cast, of KBO the primacy seems to be partly 
on hydropower prcduccica and one other development problem: transport and 
communication f r th-. land locked basin states, namely Burundi, Rwanda and 
Uganda. But the same problems apply almost with equal vigour to northwestern 
Tanzania. 
Only partly is the neeu for hydropower linked to the lack of 
hydrocarbon resources in these countries so that they have to import the same. 
It is equally significant that the importation entails over-land transportation 
through transit states. And this element of over-land transport increases 
the cost of the oil and other imports. Therefore, the land-locked condition 
of the basin states becomes a serious problem even for other development 
sectors including agriculture and industry. To some extent, then transport 
and communication infrastructure and alternatives become a central development 
goal for the basin states: both are prerequisite to any future development 
J.1AJ/LT JLUT 
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of the region and the KfaO member states have treated it as such. Fortuna-
tely the construction of the roads and railways as well as the prospects 
for their profitable utilization .^re a rather straight forward matter. 
but not so with hydroelectric power. Its production needs to be 
ne_ds to be inextricably tied to major users at whose hands the power 
actually enhances revenue earning enterprises. Very primarily, these should 
have acore of industries. 
At the centre of the hydropower production are eight sites: Rusumo,, 
Kakono, Gitega, Kishanda, Wyabarongo, Murawendo, Rukarara and Murogwe which, 
together will vield approximately 425 MW and cost US$ 572,200,000. Assuming 
that this amount, which is only for construction, is received as loan. The 
consumers of the power should have enough income to help reply the loan. 
The other major consumer is irrigation. Domestic and municipal consumers 
are smaller capacities and with less ability to meet the loan repayment 
schedules. 
The general review of the KBO studies indicate there is inadequate 
preparedness of bankable industrial projects. This is a fatal weakness 
especially for the viability of the hydropower schemes. Ordinarily, industries 
are vital in a regional development setting of this kind because it is an 
index in the structural deversificatiori of the economy and offers opportunities 
for employment and for processing of the locally generated raw materials 
particularly the agricultural products. But in this case it it, also important 
for the stable use and payment for the energy. Clearly, the identification 
and preparation of industrial projects is a critical weakness, and this might, 




Irrigated agriculture also seemed another leading contender for 
f 
the consumption of the hydropower. In the first place the plans for 
irrigation are limited with the three sites selected at Rusumo Cuvette, 
Bugesera and Kyaka-Kakono regions. But even if it was accepted that their 
consumption level is significant the rate of returns might not be very high 
from the onset. To date there is very little, if any, experience with 
irrigated agriculture in the Kagera basin. What exists seem to be the expe-
rience in the Kagera Region of Tanzania. However, the actual success within 
the region has not been certain. 
From the experience in the Senegal basin and in Kenya's National 
Irrigation Board it seems evident that irrigated agriculture has its ov?n 
culture whose evolution is a tough roacl. The distinctly successful experi-
ence in Africa has been in Kgypt, Sudan and Madagascar, Zimbabwe is evolving 
some Interesting experience in its Java and Lundi basins- Otherwise the 
experience of Kerya's National Irrigation Board and of SAED in Senegal both 
show very careful arrangements should be made in the creation of irrigation 
institutions and the mobilization of farmers. 
The point is that the Kagera basin states will have to fight 
resolutely to avoid such basis of folly in Senegal and Kenya as over-bureaucra-
tization of the farming institution; over-centralizaticn of that bureau-
cracy; over-politicization of the institution especially in the deployment 
as the basis oi deployment; failure to consider established productivity 
as the basis for retention of jobs; and total insensitivity to the needs of 
the farmer. 
It is suggested here that to prepare the selected areas for irri-
gated agriculture deliberate plans should be made to maximize farmer parti-
cipation in the decision-making. Pi_ns should also be organized to take the 
farmers co-operative leaders, and th : extension workers on tnurs of selected 
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irrigated farms. That list should include cases such as Bura or Ahero and 
West Kano Irrigation scheme where the tour group could see exactly what a 
disaster in irrigation schemes look like. Tours of the Madagascar and 
Sudan may also [:ive a different picture. But success in irrigated agriculture 
under KBO will require considerable innovation and education among farmers 
and institutional leaders. 
Except for the plans to fight trypanosomiasis general environ-
mental and health questions s:em to have been given a rather cursory treatment 
in the preparatory studies. Vectorborne diseases such as malaria, bilharzia 
and river blindness are left for further studies. But the impact of dams on 
general ecosystem such as in Nyabarongo valley in Kagera National Park and 
downstream cf Kagera Weir seem to have been glossed over rather cavalierly. 
Similarly, various industries are anticipated in the study. 
Granted that their feasibilities have not been assessed in detail, but the 
volume on environment provides no arrangements for mitigating any negative 
effects. Development within this context must be seen to include protection 
of public health and provision of basic needs like clean drinking water. 
Therefore, efforts should be apparent to ensure that the industries do not 
pollute ?.nd render water unsuitable for human consumption. Of course water 
pollution might inherently mean contamination or killing of living resources 
such as fish which could provide protein. All these would be contrary to the 
development goals. 
Ultimately, systematic monitoring, exchange of information and 
standardization of methods for all water flowing into Lake Victoria, as was 
proposed by senior regional officials at the Kisumu Workshop in 1982 seem a 
practical approach. The coordinating role was given to Kenya's Lake Basin 
Development Authority which could, in fact, take the initiative as part of 
the development oriented successor-task to the Hydromet Project which started 
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in 1967 but has since completed its primary task of data-collection. 
The product include, inter alia, computerized models for the quantitative 
and qualitative aspects of water input into Lake Victoria. Conservation, 
as part of rational management of natural resources, is not an interven-
tion in the development process, it Is part of that process. 
The Rusumo Agreement was, in fact, very laconical on the question 
o'f environment. It should have spelled out the scope of obligation 
of states on environmental matters. And since the KBO programmes envisaged 
major industrial and agricultural development as well as major construction 
of infrastructure there should have been stated legal obligation to prevent 
environmental injuries within the member-statas including to citizens, as 
well as beyond the jurisdiction of the basin-states. The remedies should 
have included adminstrative and judicial machineries accessible to the states 
and to the citizens. 
The machinery for settlement of disputes should have been clearly 
and suitably articulated to include consensual as well as arbitral orjudicial 
remedies. The hypothesis here is that the consensual machinery to be guided 
by a panel of selected experts should find workable solution to disputes. 
Perhaps the existence of the decisional machineries will encourage states 
to make the consensual remedy effective so that the states might not use the 
arbitral or judicial mechanisms. 
On the financing questions the KBO seems to have hoped too much 
for grants particularly through donor conferences. The only clearly arti-
culated source is the equal contribution by the contracting states to meet 
administrative expenses oi the organization. With the rising size of 
bureaucracy over the years, this source may be seriously strained, which 
inie rs that they may not do more than just keep the Secretariat alive. 
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It seems thr.t the KBO States should also formulate financial 
arrangements for major common projects such as Rusumo dam project, Kemondo 
bay, Kishanda dam, and a selection of other regional projects. This 
arrangements shoulu include commitment to a system for guarantee of loans 
as is the practice of the OMVS. 
But the financial responsibilities may be eased if the states 
agree that the KBO Commission will have a coordinating role while most of 
the projects will be funded and implemented through the initiatives of the 
territorial states. The reticulation of projects as agreed would then 
form "puzzle pieces" to be fitted and completed to completion within an 
agreed framework. 
KBO has ci rrectly identified manpower development as a crucial 
area in its programme. In fact there is no substitute to indigenous 
trained manpower and no African country should expect to be developed by 
use of foreign "experts". Such experts could only supplement the indige-
nous capabilities. In the end, however, KBO should be alert to the need 
to attract and retain the best qualified and dedicated staff for implemen-
tation of its projects. 
